Thursday, April 10, 2008

Texas Federal/State Comparison: George Milner,III., Milner & Finn, Dallas, Texas

CRIMINAL PRACTICE IN TEXAS
STATE AND U.S. DISTRICT COURTS - A COMPARISON


by: George R. Milner, III
Milner & Finn
Dallas, Texas
www.milnerfinn.com


I. INTRODUCTION

Most attorneys will begin their careers practicing in either state or federal court, but

rarely both. You might begin as a state prosecutor or public defender, and then become a

private defense attorney. Alternatively, you might have begun as a federal prosecutor,

public defender or clerking for a district judge. You become immersed in one system to the

virtual exclusion of the other. As your practice changes, you start practicing in the other

court system and wonder whether the differences are significant. “Hey, it’s the same

country with the same federal constitution. How different could they be?” The answer is,

plenty. And, the differences are not trivial.

This article will analyze and compare federal criminal practice with Texas state

criminal practice. It is an overview, and is not intended to be an in-depth analysis. It is

designed to be a primer for attorneys who are well versed in one system and are beginning

a practice in the other. There are many distinctions between practice in federal and state

court. But, the trial procedures are relatively similar. Generally, practice in the federal courts

tend to be more formal, whereas practice in state court may be less formal. This will obviously

vary depending upon the particular judge, whether it be state or federal court. The federal

constitutional principals are obviously identical.



State representation frequently begins with the arrest of your client. The client then hires an attorney to represent him or her in the anticipated criminal case. A federal criminal action could begin the same way. However, it is much more common that the client, known literally as a target, is aware of an on-going criminal investigation. The client should, and frequently does, hire an attorney during this investigative process. If the client has the slightest level of intelligence, he will immediately retain counsel upon learning of the existence of the investigation. Generally speaking, in the state system, the government arrests first, and then prepares a case for trial. In the federal system, the government prepares its case first and then arrests. Representation of a client in a federal criminal case is well beyond the scope of this article. This article is intended to only address the pragmatic distinctions between state and federal practice.
II. PRE-TRIAL ISSUES

A. Arrest

1. Texas Law

Texas law imposes no constitutional requirement to affect an arrest. Hulit v. State, 982 S.W 2d 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Tex. C. Crim P., Art. 14 provides for various situations where a peace office may or shall make a warrantless arrest. Article 14 further provides authority for a private citizen to affect a warrantless arrest.
An individual arrested in Texas is brought before a magistrate who will arraign the accused and set bail. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 14.06. This is almost always done in an ex parte manner with information coming almost exclusively from the police. Bail will usually be set at some amount which may be posted in cash or by a bonding company. The bail is posted with the sheriff of the county where the client has been arrested. Or, if the client is arrested pursuant to an out of county warrant, bail may be posted with the sheriff of the county where the warrant has been issued.
2. Federal Law
A federal arrest may, likewise, be made with or without a warrant. However, there is no statutory provision for a warrantless arrest. An arrest must simply be supported by probable cause. Draper v. United States, 385 U.S. 307 (1959). Most federal arrests are, however, made pursuant to a warrant. Warrantless arrests will be substantially more common in state court prosecutions.
The bail process in federal court is done pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The accused is brought before a federal magistrate for an initial appearance. Both the government and citizen may present evidence relevant to bail. However, the court will review a pre-trial services report prepared by the probation department. This report is confidential as a matter of law. 18 U.S.C. § 3153 (c)(1). It is essentially a short background and social history report regarding your client.
Once the judge has considered the pre-trial services report, any evidence presented, and argument of counsel, the magistrate will release the defendant, set bail or detain the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (a). Unlike state court, there is a preference for personal recognizance bonds. It is generally the case that your client will be released on his own recognizance or not at all. Again, unlike state court, denial of bail is quite common.
The Eighth Amendment notwithstanding, there is a good chance your client will begin serving his sentence while awaiting his or her trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (d). Should the magistrate detain your client, you may appeal this to the district court. The procedure is to file a motion to Revoke Detention Order. United States v. Ruben Rueben, 974 F. 2d 580, 585 ( 5th Cir. 1992) Cert. Denied, 507 U.S. 940 (1993). The district court’s review of the magistrate’s order is conducted de novo.
Counsel is well advised to prepare the client for the pre-trial services interview with the officer. The client should dress appropriately and be familiar with the process. The client must fully understand that while he or she may refuse to answer particular questions, the client may not provide false information. Counsel must use sound judgment in determining what information to provide the officer. If the offense is a financial crime, you may not wish to disclose personal financial information to the officer. Although the pre-trial services report is confidential, a copy will be given to the prosecutor. It is reasonable to assume he or she will read it and take notes. Alternatively, if you provide very limited information, the magistrate may not be able to determine your client is not a flight risk. Counsel must use sound judgment.
B. Indictment
1. Texas Law

An indictment is a written statement of a grand jury accusing a person of a crime. Tex. C.

Crim. P., Art. 21.01. Although there are some procedural requirements, the offense charged must

be set forth in plain and intelligible words. See Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 21.02. Everything

necessary to be proved should be stated in the indictment. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 21.03. However,

the state is not required to plead evidentiary matters, and generally need only plead the elements

constituting the offense. Generally, if the indictment tracks the relevant statute, it will be

sufficient. However, the indictment must be sufficiently certain such that it will enable the

accused to plead the judgment in bar of any subsequent prosecution of the same offense. Tex. C.

Crim. P., Art. 21.04.

Texas law provides that a grand jury shall be comprised of twelve grand jurors and

two alternates. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 19.18. A quorum is comprised of nine grand jurors. Tex. C.

Crim. P., Art. 19.40. Grand jury proceedings shall be secret. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 20.02.

Although the concept of the grand jury might be similar under Texas law as compared with

federal law, there is vast difference in function. A grand jury in Texas is principally used to

screen criminal accusations. Cases are presented and the grand jurors deliberate and vote whether

to indict. It is only required that nine jurors vote affirmatively in order to return an indictment.

Tex.C. Crim. P., Art. 20.19. Generally speaking, the state grand jury does not pro-actively

investigate criminal matters, although it has such authority. Cases are presented to the

grand jury by the relevant district attorney, and the grand jury votes whether to return an

indictment. Further, Texas law does not proscribe communication with the grand jury by defense

counsel. This is commonly done by delivering written information through, and with the consent

of, the prosecutor.

2. Federal Law

A federal indictment may be similar to a state indictment, but it’s usually not. It must contain the essential facts constituting the offense charged. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 ( c ). The indictment must also state the specific statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is accused of violating. Id. It is quite common for a prosecutor to write an indictment which describes the alleged criminal conduct in a lengthy narrative form. And, as might be expected, it is common for the prosecutor to tell the story in a light most favorable to the government. The court may, upon defendant’s motion, strike surplusage contained in the indictment. Fed. R. Crim. P. 7 (d). And, it is important to carefully examine the indictment because, unlike state court, the indictment goes into the jury room during deliberations.
A federal grand jury is comprised of 16 to 23 members. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (a). An indictment required only the concurrence of at least twelve members of the grand jury. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (f). The federal grand jury is not a screening mechanism for criminal prosecutions. On the contrary, the federal grand jury is a weapon of the prosecutor. A federal grand jury possesses extremely broad investigative power. A federal grand jury may investigate merely upon suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991). Although the grand jury was at one time designed to protect the individual from the government, those days have clearly passed. The grand jury has the power to subpoena documents and witnesses. Federal prosecutors tend to thoroughly investigate their cases through sworn grand jury testimony and documents obtained pursuant to subpoena. And, contrary to Texas state law, the direct submission of any written materials or documents by the defense to a federal grand jury is, itself, a federal criminal offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1504.
C. Speedy Trial

1. Texas Law

There is no valid statutory act requiring a right to a speedy trial. Meshel v. State,

739 S.W. 2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Texas law simply applies the Sixth Amendment

standard as according to Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101

(1972). There is no bright line rule and no inflexible test. However, the court must consider the

length of delay, the reason for delay, assertion of the right to a speedy trial by the defendant, and

any prejudice to the defendant due to the delay.

2. Federal Law

Federal law provides a statutory speedy trial right. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161. This

statutory speedy trial right commences upon arrest of the accused for a federal, not state, offense.

United States v. Adams, 694 F. 2d 200 (9th Cir 1982). The indictment must be returned within 30

days of arrest. Trial must commence within 70 days of either indictment or initial appearance,

whichever occurred later. No trial may commence prior to 30 days from indictment or initial

appearance. The court has authority to dismiss, either with or without prejudice, an indictment

based upon violations of this statutory speedy trial right. But, there are a number of enumerated

factors which the court must consider before dismissing an indictment with prejudice. These

include the seriousness of the offense, the facts and circumstances which lead to dismissal, the

impact of re-prosecution on administration of the speedy trial right and on the administration of

justice. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (a)(1).

The statute provides for the exclusion of time which is due to a number of enumerated

factors which the court must consider. These include: 1.) a competency examination of the defendant; 2.) times during which the defendant is mentally or physically incompetent; 3.) time during which the defendant is in drug treatment with a prosecution deferral ; 4.) any time during which an inter-lockatory appeal is proceeding; 5.) pending pre-trial motions; 6.) time caused by transferring the case or removal of a defendant from another district; 7.) time during which the court considers any plea agreement; 8.) time during which prosecution is deferred 9.) time during which the defendant or an essential witness is absent; 10.) A “reasonable period” of delay when the defendant is joined with co-defendants whose speedy trial has not run; 11.) time during which “ the ends of justice ...outweighs the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial ” because of (a) an unusual or complex case, or (b) because of continuity of counsel for the government or defendant. 18 U.S.C. 3161 (h).It is important to assume in federal court that you may not be able to obtain a continuance of a trial. This is true even if the government does not oppose the defendant’s motion for continuance. The trial court is constrained by the Speedy Trial Act. It is important that you review the statutory provisions thoroughly and address them in your motion for continuance. You should provide supporting material to justify your factual and legal arguments for a continuance. And, at the same time, you must be prepared to try the case on the scheduled trial date.
D. Joinder
1. Texas Law

Texas law provides that a defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal transaction

for all offenses rising out of the same criminal episode. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 3.02.

2. Federal Law

Federal law provides for broader joinder of offenses. An indictment or information may

charge a defendant with two or more offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, if the

offenses are of the same or similar character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are

connected with or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8. Rule 8 is

broadly construed in favor of initial joinder. United States v. Davis, 752 F. 2d 963 (5th Cir.

1985). Essentially, joinder is proper if the offenses occurred over a relatively short time period

and share some evidentiary matters. United States v. Lueben, 812 F. 2d 179 (9th Cir. 1987).

E. Severance

1. Texas Law

Texas law provides a broad right of severance. Generally speaking, a defendant

has an absolute right to a severance of offenses which have been consolidated or joined for trial.

Tex. Penal C. §.304. However, there is a potential catch. Texas law generally provides that if a

defendant is convicted of more than one criminal offense in one trial proceeding, the sentences

generally must run concurrently, as opposed to consecutively. Tex. Penal C.§ 3.03 (a). But, if a

defendant elects to sever offenses which have been joined for trial, the court in its discretion may

order the sentences to run concurrently or consecutively. Tex. Penal C. § 3.04 (b). Counsel must

give grave consideration before asking for a severance.

There are other limitations upon the broad right of severance under Texas law.

Generally, sex offenses may not be severed. The specific offenses are listed in Tex. Penal C.

§ 3.03 (a). If the relevant offenses are enumerated in § 3.03 (b), the court, before ordering a

severance, must determine that either the state or the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced

by a joinder of the offenses. Tex. Penal C. § 3.04 (c).

2. Federal Law

Federal law provides a limited right to a severance. If joinder of offenses or

defendants appears to prejudice the government or a defendant, the court may sever the

defendants’ trials, order separate trials as to separate counts, or provide any other relief that

justice requires. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 (b) (5), a motion to sever

must be made prior to trial. Personal observation suggests federal judges do not enjoy trials.

Likewise, federal judges appear to enjoy multiple trials substantially less. Accordingly, unless

you can make a firm showing of overwhelming prejudice, you should expect to have all criminal

offenses and defendants tried together in one proceeding.

F. Discovery

1. Texas Law

Discovery in Texas state courts is generally covered by Chapter 39 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure. A state court defendant’s right to discovery is, in most situations, provided

by Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 39.14. The defendant in state court, generally has right to examine

physical evidence. The defendant has no right to discover witness statements, until after the

witness has testified. See Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 39.14 (a); Tex. R. Evid. 615 (a).

Texas law also provides both the state and defendant a right to notice of expert

witnesses. See Tex. C. Crim. P. Art.39.14 (b).The court upon motion of either party, may order a

party or parties to disclose the name and address of each witness the party may use to present

evidence pursuant to Texas Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 705. Texas law also provides a

defendant reasonable notice upon request, not a motion, to the state’s intention to offer evidence

of extraneous wrongs, crimes or bad acts, either at the guilty/not guilty phase or the punishment

phase. See Tex. R. Evid. 404 (b) and Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 37.07.

2. Federal Law

Discovery in federal court is pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P., 16. However, it is

important to completely familiarize yourself with the relevant judge’s pre-trial order. Frequently,

a judge will enter a pre-trial order which addresses discovery issues. Filing a motion for

discovery might advise the court you have not read the court’s order. If there is no discovery

order issued by the court, the right to discovery is triggered by defense motion. However,

counsel should be aware this will trigger reciprocal discovery requirements. Generally, the

defense is entitled to the defendant’s written or oral statements, the defendant’s prior record, any

documents and objects which the government either possesses or controls, if they are material to

preparing the defense, or the government intends to use them in its case in chief at trial, or the

item was obtained or belongs to the defendant; the reports of examinations and tests; expert

witnesses. Fed. R. Crim. P., 16. The defense is not entitled to witness statements, except as

provided by 18 U. S. C. § 3500. And, the defense is not entitled to grand jury transcripts, except

as provided by Fed. R. Crim. P. 6, 12 (h), 16 (a)(1), and 26.2.

G. Plea Negotiation

1. Texas Law

Plea negotiations in Texas courts are incredibly different than in federal court. At

the outset, plea negotiation in state court is almost universally conducted post indictment.

Additionally, plea negotiations in Texas courts are quite similar to contractual negotiations. The

state and defense may, and typically do, negotiate the precise sentence which the defendant will

receive based upon his plea of guilty or no contest. The court is not bound by the agreement.

Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 26.13. However, the defendant has the right to withdraw his plea if the

court advises that it will not follow the agreement between the parties. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art.

26.13. This fact alone makes state plea bargaining vastly different than federal plea bargaining.

And, in the vast majority of the cases, the trial court will follow an agreement between the state

and the defendant.

2. Federal Law

On the other hand, plea negotiations are frequently done prior to indictment in

federal representations. If a satisfactory plea agreement is going to be reached in federal court, it

generally must be consummated prior to indictment. An indictment reduces the number of

sentencing options. At the outset, counsel may negotiate a “charge bargain.” This means defense

counsel negotiates an agreement with the government to only charge the defendant with a

specific criminal offense. Generally, this is done in order to charge the defendant with a criminal

offense which has a lower statutory maximum punishment than other offenses which could be

charged by the government. However, charge bargaining is not as readily available as it once

was. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft directed prosecutors to charge defendants with the

most severe, readily provable offense. Charge bargaining, accordingly, may be limited

depending upon the particular prosecutor’s adherence to this directive. This directive was originally set forth in the Ashcroft Sentencing Memorandum, and this was reaffirmed in the Comey Sentencing Memorandum issued in 2005.
Contrary to Texas law, there is rarely an agreement to a specific sentence in

federal court. Federal sentences are determined by giving extreme deference to the now

“advisory” United States Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125

S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005). Essentially, the defendant will plead guilty to one or

more criminal offenses. The court will advise the defendant that sentencing will be determined

by consideration of the “advisory” United States Sentencing Guidelines. The court must also

consider all matters relevant to sentencing pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a). The defendant will

be advised that except for the statutory maximum, no one can determine what the specific

sentence will be. The defendant will be advised that if the sentence is substantially higher than

the defendant expected, he will not be able to withdraw his plea.

Your client will then meet with a probation officer for a pre-sentence interview.

The probation officer will do a thorough background report on the client. The probation officer

will also communicate with the prosecutor and relevant enforcement agents. The probation

officer will then prepare a pre-sentence report which will advise the court of the relevant

sentencing guidelines and will provide the court with a specific guideline range of punishment.

Both counsel for the government and the defendant will have the right to object to this report. In

the end, the judge will make the final decision as to which guideline range is applicable.

Although not binding, a sentence in his range will be deemed “reasonable.” The court may then

consider other matters, if applicable. Then, the court will sentence the defendant.

It is important to understand the probation officer has been well trained to

understand every conceivable way to increase, not decrease, the guideline range. The client

should be made to understand this. You must go to the interview with your client. The client

should dress appropriately. If there are matters outside the guidelines which may affect

sentencing, you must start laying the groundwork for these at the pre-sentence interview. If your

client has a substance abuse issue, he or she may qualify for the Comprehensive Residential

Drug Abuse Program. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (e). You should provide information to the probation

officer which demonstrates a genuine substance abuse problem. Ultimately, your client may

shave a year off his sentence for successful completion of the program.

H. Pre-trial Motions

1. Texas Law

The filing and urging of pre-trial motions in state court is reasonably similar to the

process in federal court. Whether you are in state or federal court, it is imperative that you be

familiar with the particular court’s scheduling, orders, and/or procedures. Many courts, both in

state and federal court, have standing pre-trial orders. Many state courts will have an informal

process, and will not require that pre-trial motions be filed and/or scheduled by any particular

day. Some state courts will schedule a pre-trial hearing. If there is a pre-trial hearing date, and

the court has not ordered that motions be filed by a particular day, then all pre-trial motions

should be filed at least seven days prior to that date. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 28.10 § 2. Although

the practice should be discouraged, it is acceptable to file boiler plate motions in many state

cases. A state court motion should be tailored to the case. And, although not required, it may be

helpful to file a brief in support of your motion.

2. Federal Law

The substantial difference in federal court is that the process will be somewhat

more formal. You will almost always be given a scheduling order imposing a deadline or the

filing of pre-trial motions. It is common to never afford the defendant a live hearing on the

motions. And, unlike state court, boiler plate motions should not be used.

The practice in federal court is more time consuming. All pre-trial motions should

be tailored specifically to the relevant facts and legal issues raised by the particular case.

Additionally, counsel should carefully review the local rules of the district. Many pre-trial

motions require submission of a brief or memorandum of law in support of a motion. Counsel

should understand the pre-trial motion and supporting brief may be the only argument you will

make to the court. Never assume that you will be permitted a live hearing or oral argument. If

factual support is necessary, you should attach supporting documents and/or affidavits.

Additionally, most federal districts require the moving party to consult with the

attorney for the opposing side. This means all pre-trial motions must be discussed with the

opposing attorney. You are generally required to ask whether the opposing attorney agrees to the

granting of the motion. You will then attach a “Certificate of Conference” to your pre-trial

motion. The Certificate of Conference will verify that you have discussed the motion with

the opposing attorney, and state whether the opposing attorney agrees to or opposes the motion.

There is another fundamental distinction between state court and federal court. Unlike

state court, motions filed in federal court will be thoroughly read. If they are not completely read

by the judge, they certainly will be read carefully by the clerks. You should proof read the

motion and supporting memoranda or brief.

I. Change of Venue

1. Texas Law

If the judge determines either party cannot receive a fair and impartial trial in the county,

the judge may sua sponte order venue transferred to any county within the district. Tex. C. Crim.

P., Art. 31.01. The court must provide notice to the parties and conduct a hearing on the issue. Id.

The state may move for a change of venue for existing influences favoring the accused, general

lawlessness in the county, or potential risk to the lives of the defendant or a witness. Tex. C.

Crim. P., Art. 31.02. The defendant may move to change venue by filing a written motion along

with the defendant’s affidavit and the affidavits of at least two credible persons who are residents

of the county where the prosecution is instituted. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 31.03. The affidavits

must show either there is so great a prejudice against the defendant in the county that he or she

cannot get a fair trial, or there is a dangerous combination against the defendant instigated by

influential persons such that he cannot expect a fair trial. Id.

Texas law also permits a forum non conveniens change of venue. This may be done upon

motion of the defendant for convenience of parties and witnesses. But, such a motion is

discretionary and requires the consent of the state. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 31.03 (b).

2. Federal Law

Federal law is more restrictive. A transfer of venue based upon prejudice must be made

upon the defendant’s motion. Fed. C. Crim. P. 21 (a). It cannot be ordered sua sponte or on

motion by the government. Id. Federal law also permits a forum non conveniens change of

venue. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 21 (b). The state and federal standards are essentially the same,

except the federal rule does not require consent of the government. See Id.

III. FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES

Arguably, Texas provides greater protection from unreasonable search and seizure

than the Fourth Amendment. See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681(Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In

any given case, counsel should thoroughly research whether evidence was obtained in violation

of either the Texas or U.S. Constitutions. However, there are some general distinctions between

Texas law and U.S. law in the area of search and seizure. Additionally, there is significant and

pervasive distinction between state and federal court in this area. State law generally permits the

defendant to argue the exclusionary rule to the jury. If a fact is raised, the defendant can request

the jury be instructed to not consider evidence if the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt the evidence was lawfully obtained.

Federal law, on the other hand, does not permit this. Application of the exclusionary rule

is purely a question of law for the court. The jury in a federal trial will not be instructed to

disregard any evidence admitted based upon a Fourth Amendment violation.

A. Good Faith

If a search warrant is found to be defective, Texas does not permit a good faith exception

to the exclusionary rule. See Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 38.23 (b). A search warrant affidavit must

provide probable cause. Gordon v. State, 801 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). On the other

hand, federal law permits a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).

B. Inevitable Discovery

In federal court, there is an inevitable discovery doctrine permitting an exception to the

exclusionary rule. See Nix v. Williams 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984).

However, Texas law does not permit inevitable discovery as an exception to the exclusionary

rule. See Garcia v. State, 829 S. W. 2d 796 (Tex. Crim App. 1992).; State v. Daugherty, 931

S.W. 2d 268 (Tex. Crim App. 1996) (Reh’g. Denied).

C. Illegal Conduct by Private Citizen

The exclusionary rule in Texas courts applies to the conduct of government agents and

private citizens. See Tex. C. Crim P., Art. 38.23 State v. Johnson, 939 S. W. 2d 586 (Tex. Crim

App. 1996). The exclusionary rule in federal court does not apply to the conduct of private

citizens.

D. Consent

The burden on the government is different when consent to search is at issue. In Texas

courts, the state must prove consent by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Ibarra, 953

S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Crim App. 1997). However, in federal courts, the government must only prove

consent by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S. Ct.

988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974).

IV. CONFESSIONS

1. Texas Law

Texas law provides that the admissibility of confessions is controlled by the Fifth

Amendment and Tex. C. Crim P., Art. 38.22. Generally speaking, in order to admit a statement

resulting from custodial interrogation, the state must prove the statement was voluntarily made,

the defendant was advised of his or her rights pursuant to Art. 38.22, and the statement was

either written or electronically recorded. See Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 38.22. Counsel should

thoroughly review 38.22 as there are other potential requirements and exceptions which might

apply.

The defendant may initially challenge the voluntariness of any statement outside the

jury’s presence by objecting or requesting such a hearing. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368,

84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964). The defendant must initially produce some evidence

which controverts the presumption of proper police conduct, thus shifting the burden to the state.

The state then bears the burden of proving the confession was voluntarily given. Munoz v. State,

851 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); (overruled on other grounds). Dunn v. State, 721

S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The judge must determine the confession to be voluntary

before it may be admitted before the jury. Implicit in these cases is the conclusion the judge must

determine that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession

was voluntary.

A significant distinction is that once you lose the Jackson v. Denno hearing (and you

will), Texas law affords the defendant the right to challenge the confession in front of the jury.

Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 38.22 § 6. The defendant may present evidence regarding the voluntariness

of the confession. And, the jury will be instructed that unless it believes beyond a reasonable

doubt that the confession was voluntarily given, the jury may not consider it for any purpose

whatsoever. Id. Moreover, the exclusionary instruction directs the jury to not consider any

evidence which was derived from the statement by the accused.

2. Federal Law

On the other hand, there is no such requirement for a confession to be admitted in federal

court. The issue to be determined by the court is whether the statement was freely and

voluntarily made, and whether the agents complied with Miranda. Generally speaking, if the

agents complied with Miranda and did not beat the defendant senseless, a court will usually find

the statement to have been made freely and voluntarily. And, unlike state court, the government

must prove voluntariness only by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479

U.S. 157, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). But, as is true in state court, the defendant is

entitled to a hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine whether the confession was

voluntary. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S. Ct. 1774, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1964).





V. DOUBLE JEAPARDY

1. Texas Law

Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is sworn. State v. Proctor, 841 S.W. 2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In a trial without a jury, jeopardy attaches when the accused pleads to the charging instrument. State v. Torres, 805 S.W. 2d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). This holding is not based upon the Fifth Amendment, but is required by Tex. Const., Art. I § 14.
2. Federal Law

The rule is the same in a jury trial. Jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn. Donum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S. Ct. 1033, 10 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1963). However, the rule is different in a bench trial. Jeopardy attaches in a trial to the court when the court begins to hear evidence. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 95 S. Ct. 1055, 1062, 43 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1975). The Supreme Court later, in dicta, interpreted this to mean jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 37, 98 S. Ct. 2156, 2162 n 15, 57 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1978).
VI. DISCLOSURE OF DEFENSES

A. Alibi

1. Texas Law

Texas law does not regard alibi as a defense. This is simply a factual scenario which is

inconsistent with the state’s case. An alibi is simply offered to rebut the state’s case. There is no

requirement that the defendant provide notice to the state of his or her intention to assert an alibi.

2. Federal Law

However, the defendant in federal court may have to provide notice to the government of

the defendant’s intention to assert alibi as a defense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1. The government

must request said notice in writing. The request must state the time, date, and place of the alleged

offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12.1 (a)(1). Upon such request, the defendant must, within 10 days of

the request or any time designated by the court, serve written notice on the government of any

intended alibi defense. The defendant’s notice must state each specific place where the defendant

claims to have been and the name, address, and telephone number of each alibi witness on whom

the defendant will rely. Fed. R. Crim P. 12.1 (a)(2). The defendant may then request information

pertaining to witnesses who establish the defendant’s presence at the scene of the alleged offense

and government rebuttal witnesses. If either party fails to comply, the court may exclude

testimony of undisclosed witnesses.

B. Insanity

1. Texas Law

Insanity is an affirmative defense under Texas law. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 46C.051.

The defendant must provide notice at least twenty days prior to trial, unless the trial Court

schedules a pre-trial hearing more than twenty days prior to trial. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 46C.051.

Should the court schedule a pre-trial hearing more than twenty days in advance of trial, the

defendant must provide notice at the pre-trial hearing. If the defendant fails to provide the

required notice, the court will not admit evidence on the insanity defense unless the court finds

good cause exists for the failure to give notice. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 46C.052.

2. Federal Law

A defendant in federal court must provide written notice to the government of his

intention to assert an insanity defense. This notice must be provided at the time pre-trial

motions are filed, or at any time designated by the court. Fed. R. Crim P. 12.2 (a). The

government may then compel, pursuant to Rule 12.2 (c), the defendant to submit to a

competency examination under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (statute pertaining to determination of

mental competency to stand trial).

C. Duress

1. Texas Law

Texas law provides that duress is an affirmative defense which the defendant must prove

by a preponderance of the evidence. Charles v. State, 636 S.W. 2d 5, 6 (Tex. App. Dallas 1992)

(pet. ref’d).

2. Federal Law

The federal law is substantially different. The initial burden of production rests upon the

defendant. The defendant must make a prima facie showing of duress. However, once that is

done the burden shifts to the government to affirmatively disprove duress beyond a reasonable

doubt. United States v. Falcon, 766 F.2d 1469, 1477 (10th Cir. 1985).

VII. TRIAL

A. Jury Selection

1. Texas Law

Each side is permitted ten peremptory challenges in a non-capital felony trial in

Texas. Tex. C. Crim P., Art. 35.15 (b). Both parties are entitled to three peremptory

challenges in a misdemeanor case tried in a county court. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 35.15

(c). The parties are entitled to five peremptory challenges in a misdemeanor case tried

in a district court. Id. Additionally, Tex. Const., Art. I § 10 provides the right of counsel

to question the venire in order to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. Ex parte

McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim App. 1990). The ability to properly question the

jurors will be the fundamental distinction between the state and federal court. Counsel

for both the state and defendant are generally permitted to adequately question the

panel.

2. Federal Law

Federal law provides the defendant with ten peremptory challenges, and the

government is entitled to six. Fed. R. Crim. P. 24. However, if there are multiple

defendants, the defense will still only be entitled to ten peremptory challenges which

must be shared among the defendants. The court has the authority to grant additional

peremptory challenges. The court may empanel up to six alternates, and each side will

be entitled to one additional peremptory challenge in the alternate zone. The court is

not required to permit individual questioning by the attorneys. United States v. Segal,

534 F.2d 578 (5th Cir.1976).

Many federal judges will not permit attorney voir dire. And, those federal judges who

permit it generally impose severe time limitations. The trial court has almost limitless discretion

in the conducting of voir dire. Mu’Min v. Virginia 500 U.S. 415, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 114 L. Ed. 2d

493 (1991). You will generally provide the court with a list of requested voir dire questions. The

judge will then determine which questions will be asked. The court may ask questions which

were not submitted by either party. Typically, the judges will tend to ask questions which elicit

yes or no answers, as opposed to questions designed to elicit opinions. In short, the information

upon which you base your challenges will be very limited in federal court, as opposed to state

court.





B. Witness Statements

1. Texas Law

Tex. R. Ev. 615 controls the production of witness statements in criminal cases,

except for situations which raise Brady issues. The rule generally allows a party which did

not call a witness to compel the production of any statement given by the witness which

relates to the subject matter about which the witness testified. The party requesting

production of the statement has the right to a recess of the proceedings in order to

examine the statement for use in the trial. Tex. R. Ev. 615 (d). If either party fails to produce

such a statement, the court shall strike the testimony of the witness. And, if the

state elects not to comply, the court shall declare a mistrial if required in the interest of

justice. Tex. R. Ev. 615 (e).

2. Federal Law

The federal rule is virtually identical to the Texas state rule regarding production

of witness statements after the witness has testified. See Fed. R.Crim P. 26.2. The production of

government agent and witness statements is also controlled by the Jencks Act. See 18 U.S.C. §

3500. This rule essentially provides that any recorded statement or report made by a witness is

not subject to compelled disclosure until the witness has testified on direct examination at trial.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3500. However, the defense is entitled to production after the witness testifies at

a pre-trial proceeding or detention hearing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 and 46 (j).

C. Accomplice Testimony

1. Texas Law

Texas law places restrictions upon the sufficiency of accomplice testimony. A

conviction is not sufficient if based upon accomplice testimony, unless it is corroborated by

other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art.

38.14. The corroborating evidence will, itself, be insufficient if it merely shows the

commission of the crime. Id

2. Federal Law

Federal law affords no such protection to the accused. A conviction can be based

upon uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The jury will be given a specific charge to

consider such testimony with caution, and only consider it if you believe it beyond a

reasonable doubt. Accordingly, if the jury believes the uncorroborated accomplice

testimony beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

D. Cross Examination

1. Texas Law

Both state and federal law permit and afford the right to confront and cross-examine all witnesses against the accused. U.S. Const., Amen. VI; Tex. Const., Art. I § 10. The difference is within the scope permitted the examiner during cross-examination. Texas law provides that the “witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” Tex. R. Evid. 611 (b).
2. Federal Law

The primary difference is the limitation of the scope of cross-examination. The scope of cross-examination should be limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and issues relevant to credibility of the witness. Fed. R. Evid. 611 (b). However, the court has discretion to permit cross-examination into matter beyond the scope of direct examination. Id. Another difference in federal court is the authority of the court to control the presentation and mode of cross-examination. The applicable rule permitting this, Rule 611 (a), is identical in the Texas and Federal rules. The difference is the frequency which a federal judge will use such authority.
E. Impeachment With Prior Conviction

1. Texas Law

Texas law permits either party to impeach a witness with proof the witness has been convicted of a felony or crime of moral turpitude if the judge determines the probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Tex. R. Evid. 609 (a). However, there is a time limit. If more than ten years has elapsed since the latter of the conviction date or date of release from confinement from that conviction, evidence of the conviction is inadmissible. Tex. R. Evid. 609 (b). A time-barred conviction may, however, be admissible if the judge “determines, in the interest of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.” Id. If the conviction is on appeal, it is inadmissible. Tex. R. Evid. 609 (e). If the conviction in question was the object of a pardon or similar procedure based on innocence, the conviction is not admissible. Tex. R. Evid. 609 (c) (3). If there is a pardon based upon rehabilitation or if probation was satisfactorily completed, and there is no subsequent conviction for a felony or crime involving moral turpitude, the conviction is inadmissible. Tex. R. Evid. 609 (c) (1) and (2). Additionally, upon timely written request specifying the witnesses, the proponent must give the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use evidence of the conviction. Tex. R. Evid. 609 (f). This, of course, would require a party to identify its witnesses well in advance of trial. But, failure to comply with the request for notice of intent renders evidence of the conviction inadmissible. Id.


2. Federal Law
The federal rule is significantly different. The federal rule does not permit impeachment with a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. See Fed. R. Evid. 609 (a). But, evidence that any witness has been convicted of any crime in which it can readily be determined had as an element of the crime an act of dishonesty or false statement is admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 609 (a) (2). The general rule that felony convictions are admissible is subject to application of Rule 403. Fed. R. Evid. 609 (a) (1). However, if the government offers evidence of a conviction against the accused, the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect to the accused. Id. The general ten-year rule is the same as the Texas rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 609 (b). However, if a party wished to offer evidence of a conviction more than ten years old, the proponent must give the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of its intent to use such evidence. Id. Unlike the state rule, the opponent does not have to request this notice. The effect of a pardon is the same in federal court. See Fed. R. Evid. 609 (c). But, the effect of an appeal of the conviction is exactly the opposite in federal court. A conviction is admissible even during the pendency of an appeal. Fed. R. Evid. 609 (e). But, evidence of the pendency of the appeal is, likewise, admissible. Id.
F. Hearsay

Upon the law of hearsay, there are several subtle, and some not so subtle, distinctions. Where a party offers a statement against interest in a Texas court, the availability of the declarant is immaterial. Tex. R. Evid. 803 (24). Whereas, the declarant must be unavailable to admit such a statement in federal court. Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b) (3). If the statement tends to incriminate the declarant, Texas requires the statement to be corroborated. Tex. R. Evid. 803 (24). However, this corroboration is only required in federal court if the statement is offered to exculpate the accused. Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b) (3). Accordingly, the federal counterpart only places the corroboration requirement upon the defense.
There is a significant difference with regard to “unavailability” where it is shown that a party caused the witness to be unavailable. Texas law provides that where unavailability of the declarant “is due to the procurement or wrong-doing of the proponent of the declarant’s statement”; the declarant is not deemed “unavailable.” See Tex. R. Evid. 804 (a). The federal rule is, by contrast, substantially more broad. “A statement offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrong-doing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” Fed. R. Evid. 804 (b) (6). The federal rule creates a separate exception to the hearsay rule for all such statements.
Finally, there is a general exception created by the federal rules. If a hearsay statement does not fit within the enumerated exceptions, it will not be excluded on hearsay grounds if it possesses equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and “the court determines that (a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (b) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (c) the general purpose of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 807. The proponent of such a statement must provide notice of intent to offer the statement sufficiently in advance of trial. Id. The notice must contain the name and address of the declarant. Id. This is a broad exception to the hearsay rule. Texas law provides no such residual exception to the hearsay rule.
G. Jury Charge

There are fundamental differences between state and federal court as it relates to

the jury charge. Texas law requires that a written charge distinctly setting forth the law

applicable to the case and not expressing any opinion as to the weight of evidence be

given to the jury. See Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 36.14. Both the state and defendant have the

right to object to portions of the charge, and to request special charges be included in the

charge. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 36.15. The procedure for submitting requested charges is

somewhat similar in a federal trial. However, you will generally submit you’re requested

jury instructions to the court prior to trial in accordance with a scheduling order. And, the

court will prepare a written charge to be submitted to the jury. However, a federal judge

can and will give instructions regarding specific factual issues raised by the evidence.

(See infra.) Additionally, and fundamentally different than Texas law, the court may

express opinions pertaining to the believability of witnesses and the weight to be given

certain evidence. Federal judges tend to follow the pattern charges for the relevant circuit.

But, do not limit your jury charge requests to the pattern charges for your circuit.

H. Commenting on Fact by Court

1. Texas Law

The court in its charge to the jury may express no opinion as to the weight of evidence. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 36.14. The court may not sum up testimony, discuss the facts, or use any argument calculated to arouse the sympathy or excite the passions of the jury. Id. Unless there is a specific statute to the contrary, the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 36.13.
2. Federal Law
A court at its discretion in submitting its charge to the jury, may express its opinion upon the facts so long as all matters of fact are ultimately submitted to determination by the jury. Lovejoy v. United States, 128 U.S. 171, 9 S. Ct. 57, 32 L. Ed. 389 (1888). Generally, it is the judge’s province when necessary to express his or her opinion of the evidence, provided he or she makes it known to the jury that they are free to exercise their independent judgment of the facts. And, a court may go too far in expressing its opinion of the facts. See Quercia v. United States, 53 S. Ct. 698 (1933). However, the trial court in Quercia literally instructed the jury, in reference to the defendant’s testimony, “I think that every single word that man said, except when he agreed with the government’s testimony, was a lie.” Id. This case was actually affirmed at the circuit court. See Quercia v. United States, 62 F. 2d 746 (1st Cir. 1933). Accordingly, it may be difficult for a federal judge to go too far.
I. Final Argument
1. Texas Law

Texas law permits more liberal allocation of the prosecutor’s final argument. The prosecutor is not required to open the final argument, but may simply reserve his or her entire argument for rebuttal. The court controls the order of argument, but the state enjoys the right to make the concluding argument to the jury. Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 36.07. The universal practice is to permit the state to open final argument. Then, the defense will argue, and be followed by the state’s rebuttal. It is also extremely common for a state prosecutor to reserve the more significant points for rebuttal so that defense counsel may not respond to such arguments.
2. Federal Law
Closing argument is more restrictive in federal court, both by rule and by custom. The order of arguments is controlled by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The government argues first, then the defense argues, and the government rebuts. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1. The rule does not address the situation wherein the government waives its right to open the closing arguments. However, it is the Advisory Committee’s view that such a waiver is improper. The “fair and effective administration of justice is best served if the defendant knows the argument s actually made by the prosecution in behalf of conviction before the defendant is faced with the decision whether to reply and what to reply. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1 advisory committee’s note (1975). The Committee is of the view that the prosecutor, when he waives his initial closing argument, also waives his rebuttal.” Id. (citing House Report No. 94-247.) The custom in federal court is to follow the committee’s opinions. Moreover, it appears to be the universal practice of federal prosecutors to make meaningful use of their initial closing argument and to use rebuttal for just that.
J. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal/Directed Verdict
1. Texas Law

Texas law provides the defendant an opportunity to move the court to direct the

jury to return a verdict of not guilty. This is called a motion for a directed or instructed

verdict. This motion is made outside the presence of the jury after the state has rested its

case in chief. The issue before the court is whether the state has produced some credible

evidence proving each and every element of the offense. The court will not make

determinations as to the weight to be attributed to any particular evidence. And, the

evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the state. However, if the record is devoid

of any evidence proving an element, the defense is entitled to a directed verdict. The

court will then prepare a charge which instructs the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.

2. Federal Law

The Federal procedure is different. And, it is very important that the appropriate

motion is made, and re-urged at the appropriate times. The federal motion is called

Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. The defendant in federal

court must move for a judgment for acquittal at the close of the government’s case. If the

motion is denied, the motion should be re-urged at the close of all the evidence. If there

is a guilty verdict, the defendant must renew the motion for judgment of acquittal within

seven days after the guilty verdict. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 (c) This motion is not

required. However, it will substantially change the standard of review on appeal if the

defendant fails to move for judgment of acquittal at each appropriate time.

VIII. EXPUNCTION

Texas law provides that a person acquitted of an offense is entitled to an

expunction. See Tex. C. Crim. P., Art. 55. An expunction permits a defendant to

essentially erase all public and law enforcement records arising from the arrest for the

offense. It also enables the defendant to lawfully deny that he was ever arrested for or charged

with the expunged offense.

On the contrary, there is no procedural right to an expunction in the federal

system. Federal district courts do, however, have jurisdiction to expunge records

maintained by the judiciary, but not the executive branch. United State v. Janik, 10 F. 3rd

470, 472 (7th Cir. 1993). This means, unlike Texas law, the law enforcement agency and

the Department of Justice may maintain records relating to the accusation. On the other

hand, though, a citizen in federal court may obtain a judicial expunction even when the

person was convicted of the offense. See United States v. Flowers, 389 F. 3rd 737 (7th Cir.

2004). The test is whether “the dangers of unwarranted adverse consequences to the

individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of the records, then expunction is

appropriate.” Id. At 739 (quoting Janik, 10 F. 3rd at 472).

IX. SENTENCING

Sentencing in federal court is vastly different from sentencing in Texas state

courts. Entire volumes have been written analyzing the federal sentencing guidelines. The

sentencing system in Texas state court is fairly simple. There is a range of punishment

applicable to each given offense. The defendant in state court, unlike federal court, has a

right to elect that the jury assess punishment in the event of a conviction. No such right to

jury sentencing exists in the federal system.

X. CONCLUSION

Although there are many differences, the two systems are not fundamentally

different. A trial in federal court is reasonably similar to a trial in state court. The order of

the proceedings is the same, and the manner of presenting one’s case is the same. That

being said, however, it is important to know the procedural and legal differences. And,

this article should serve as a good primer for the practitioner who is venturing into new

waters.


Good Luck and God Bless You.

Judge David Finn

Read more!

Updates to the Adam Walsh Act: John Teakell, Milner & Finn

UPDATES TO

“THE ADAM WALSH ACT”

AN OVERVIEW

by John Teakell
Milner & Finn
Dallas, TX
Federal Bar Assn.’s Federal Criminal Practice Seminar
April 11, 2008

Re: Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 - H.R.4472 – Public Law No: 109-248


I. Note

There are no official changes; however, there are several proposed updates moving through Congress. I listed the citations on those proposed changes below and the affected sections. As you know, the Adam Walsh Act is codified in several different places throughout the United States Code, so we located (and pasted below) the popular name table to allow for easy reference.

Second, regarding caselaw - We went through each section and gathered all of the “new” annotations provided in the West’s Digest system (by “new” I mean those that I did not include previously). The annotations of course provide some description of the important point that the case makes.

II. Legislative Changes

Here is the section converter table, so you can take the sections of the Act and see where they appear in the United States Code.

Section of Pub.L. 109-248 (Adam Walsh Act) USCA Classification
102 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16901
103 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16902
111 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16911
112 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16912
113 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16913
114 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16914
115 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16915
116 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16916
117 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16917
118 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16918
119 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16919
120 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16920
121 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16921
122 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16922
123 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16923
124 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16924
125 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16925
126 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16926
127 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16927
128 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16928
131 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16929
141(a)(1) ...................................... 18 USCA § 2250
142 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16941
143 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16942
144 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16943
145 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16944
146 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16945
151 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16961
153 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16962
211 ............................................ 18 USCA § 3299
301 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16971
302(4) ......................................... 18 USCA § 4248
503(a) ......................................... 18 USCA § 2257A
621 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16981
623 ............................................ 42 USCA § 3797ee
623 ............................................ 42 USCA § 3797ee-1
624 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16982
625 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16983
626 ............................................ 42 USCA § 3765
627 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16984
628 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16985
629 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16986
630 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16987
631 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16988
632 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16989
633 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16990
635 ............................................ 42 USCA § 16991
702(a) ......................................... 18 USCA § 2260A
703(a) ......................................... 18 USCA § 2252C


42 U.S.C.A. § 16911, 42 U.S.C.A. § 16913, 42 U.S.C.A. § 16914, 42 U.S.C.A. § 16918, 42 U.S.C.A. § 16919, 42 USCA § 16927 – SORNA (Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act – Title I of Adam Walsh Act) has proposed legislative action that has yet to pass in Congress.

2007 CONG US S 431, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session (Jan 30, 2007), Introduced in Senate, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

2007 CONG US HR 719, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session (Jan 30, 2007), Introduced in House, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

18 U.S.C.A. § 2250 – Failure to Register under SORNA has proposed legislative action

12007 CONG US HR 5475, 110th CONGRESS, 2d Session (Feb 19, 2008), Introduced in House, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

22007 CONG US S 2632, 110th CONGRESS, 2d Session (Feb 13, 2008), Introduced in Senate, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

32007 CONG US S 431, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session (Jan 30, 2007), Introduced in Senate, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

42007 CONG US HR 719, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session (Jan 30, 2007), Introduced in House, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

18 U.S.C.A. § 4248 – Civil Commitment of Dangerous Sex Offenders - Held unconstitutional by, U.S. v. Shields, 522 F.Supp.2d 317, 319+ (D.Mass. Nov 07, 2007); U.S. v. Comstock, 507 F.Supp.2d 522, 524+ (E.D.N.C. Sep 07, 2007)

42 U.S.C.A. § 16981 – Pilot Program for monitoring sexual offenders has proposed amendments

2007 CONG US HR 719, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session (Nov 15, 2007), Engrossed in House, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

2007 CONG US HR 719, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session (Nov 15, 2007), Referred in Senate, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

2007 CONG US HR 4094, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session (Nov 06, 2007), Introduced in House, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

§ 2252C. Misleading words or digital images on the Internet – has proposed amendments

2007 CONG US S 431, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session (Jan 30, 2007), Introduced in Senate, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

2007 CONG US HR 719, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session (Jan 30, 2007), Introduced in House, PROPOSED ACTION: Amended.

III. Caselaw Update – NEW cases

A. From Annotations on SORNA

1. Generally

Congress did not impermissibly delegate its constitutional legislative duties by providing, in Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), that Attorney General was to specify whether statute was applicable to offenders convicted prior to its enactment date, and prescribe rules for registration of offenders unable to comply with statutory requirements; Congress was merely authorizing executive branch to give advice to courts on question of retroactivity. U.S. v. Madera, M.D.Fla.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257. Constitutional Law 62(10); Mental Health 433(2)

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which imposed registration requirements on convicted sex offenders who traveled in interstate commerce, had a jurisdictional nexus, as was required to satisfy Commerce Clause. U.S. v. Mason, M.D.Fla.2007, 510 F.Supp.2d 923. Mental Health 433(2)

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), and the federal offense it created, of failing to register as a sex offender (FFR), was a proper exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause; FFR had at least a de minimis effect on interstate travel, since it regulated sex offenders who traveled across state lines. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 433(2)

Failing to register as a sex offender, pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), was a continuing offense, and therefore venue was proper, in prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register as a sex offender, in either Virginia, the state in which defendant's travel originated, or in Tennessee, the place to which defendant changed his residency and in which he failed to register; failure to register involved an element of interstate or foreign travel. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Criminal Law 113

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act's (SORNA) requirement that sex offenders register and update their registration did not apply to defendants at the time of their indictments where their convictions pre-dated SORNA and they were indicted after SORNA's effective date, but before the Attorney General exercised his authority under SORNA and issued an interim rule that made it clear that SORNA applied to sex offenders regardless of when they were convicted; the indictments occurred in the brief window during which SORNA's scope remained undefined as to past offenders, and the statute required the Attorney General to animate SORNA's provisions to previously convicted offenders. U.S. v. Kapp, M.D.Pa.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 536. Statutes 278.29

2. Ex post facto

Defendant's failure to register as a sex offender, as required by the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act (SORNA), occurred before issuance of Interim Rules making SORNA's criminal provision applicable to persons convicted before its effective date, and therefore his indictment for failing to register violated Ex Post Facto Clause. U.S. v. Gill, D.Utah 2007, 2007 WL 3018909. Mental Health 433(2)

Congress did not violate ex post facto law clause of Constitution by passing Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), on grounds that registration requirements were additional punishment inflicted upon offender after he committed sexual offense; purpose of SORNA was civil, assurance of public safety, rather than penal, and ex post facto prohibition applied only to penal provisions. U.S. v. Madera, M.D.Fla.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257. Constitutional Law 203; Mental Health 433(2)

Although Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) required sex offenders to provide detailed personal information and appear in person so that the jurisdiction could take a current photograph and verify their information, there was insufficient evidence to transform SORNA from a civil scheme into a criminal penalty, for purposes of the ex post facto clause. U.S. v. Mason, M.D.Fla.2007, 510 F.Supp.2d 923. Mental Health 433(2)

Ex Post Facto Clause precluded defendant's conviction for failing to register or update his registration as a sex offender, as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), where the defendant was covered by an interim rule making SORNA applicable to him, but had traveled in interstate commerce, without registering, before that interim rule was issued; the defendant did not commit the elements of the offense after the statute became applicable to him, and a retroactive application of the statute would have resulted in an enhanced penalty. U.S. v. Stinson, S.D.W.Va.2007, 507 F.Supp.2d 560. Mental Health 469(7)

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), and the federal offense it created, of failing to register as a sex offender (FFR), did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause by inflicting greater punishment on defendant, a previously-convicted sex offender, than was provided by law when he was convicted; Act's legislative history indicated that Congress's concern was with public safety rather than with a desire to further punish sex offenders, and the registration requirements were not so punitive as to negate Congress's intent that they be nonpunitive. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 433(2)

3. Procedural due process

Even if the sex offender registration requirements under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) were unclear prior to the issuance of the Attorney General's interim rule on February 28, 2007 making the registration requirements of SORNA applicable to individuals who had been convicted of a sex offense before the enactment of SORNA, defendant had sufficient time between that date and June 2007, the end date of his charged conduct in failing to register and update a registration required by SORNA, to apprise himself of the new federal registration requirements, and defendant was fully aware of his responsibility to register as a sex offender under North Dakota law, and thus, defendant's due process rights were not violated by his prosecution for failing to register. U.S. v. Lovejoy, D.N.D.2007, 2007 WL 2812681. Constitutional Law 4509(1); Mental Health 469(7)

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) did not violate procedural due process rights of convicted sex offender, by not providing for notice and hearing prior to publication of his name on offender registry or prior to being compelled to register as offender; since all convicted offenders were required to register, there was no need for hearings to consider circumstances of individual cases. U.S. v. Madera, M.D.Fla.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257. Constitutional Law 255(5); Mental Health 433(2)

Defendant's potential for recidivism or current dangerousness were not material to Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) and, thus, principles of procedural due process did not require a hearing for defendant to argue these issues before he was compelled to comply with SORNA's registration requirements. U.S. v. Mason, M.D.Fla.2007, 510 F.Supp.2d 923. Mental Health 469(4)

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) did not violate the procedural due process rights of defendant, a previously-convicted sex offender, by failing to give him actual notice that travel across state lines subjected him to criminal penalties; defendant had sufficient notice that failing to register was illegal. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 433(2)

4. Substantive due process

Substantive due process rights of convicted sex offenders was not violated by Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), requiring that they register and disclose their whereabouts following release. U.S. v. Madera, M.D.Fla.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257. Constitutional Law 255(5); Mental Health 433(2)

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was rationally related to legitimate government interests and, thus, did not violate the substantive due process component of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. v. Mason, M.D.Fla.2007, 510 F.Supp.2d 923. Mental Health 433(2)

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) did not, by subjecting to the Act's requirements persons who were not in fact convicted of an offense listed as a qualifying sex offense, or whose conviction was set aside, violate the substantive due process rights of defendant, a previously-convicted sex offender; defendant fell squarely within the category of persons required to register, and his conviction had not been set aside. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 433(2)

5. Continuing violation

Violation of the registration requirement of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was not a continuing offense for purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause, but rather, was complete when the defendant traveled in interstate commerce and then failed to register within the prescribed time period. U.S. v. Stinson, S.D.W.Va.2007, 507 F.Supp.2d 560. Mental Health 469(7)

6. Retroactive application

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) was not being applied retroactively to defendant and his prosecution under Act, for failure to register as a convicted sex offender, was not premature, where defendant clearly was advised that he fell within the purview of SORNA on the basis of his New York conviction for second-degree sexual assault, he was specifically told by New York law enforcement personnel that he needed to register as a sex offender in Florida if he chose to move there, and he traveled to Florida where he established residence, secured a driver's license, and was employed after SORNA went into effect, but failed to register. U.S. v. Mason, M.D.Fla.2007, 510 F.Supp.2d 923.

Defendant was required to register as a sex offender, pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), regardless of whether the Attorney General had adopted required rule specifying the applicability of the Act to sex offenders convicted before its enactment; defendant was required to register or update his registration under the existing state law of his residence. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 469(2)

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act's (SORNA) requirement that sex offenders register and update their registration did not apply to defendants at the time of their indictments where their convictions pre-dated SORNA and they were indicted after SORNA's effective date, but before the Attorney General exercised his authority under SORNA and issued an interim rule that made it clear that SORNA applied to sex offenders regardless of when they were convicted; the indictments occurred in the brief window during which SORNA's scope remained undefined as to past offenders, and the statute required the Attorney General to animate SORNA's provisions to previously convicted offenders. U.S. v. Kapp, M.D.Pa.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 536. Statutes 278.29

7. Policy safety regulation

There was rational public safety basis for regulation of interstate commerce, underlying Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requirements that released offenders report address changes to authorities, precluding claim that SORNA violated Commerce Clause. U.S. v. Madera, M.D.Fla.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 1257. Mental Health 433(2)

8. Commerce clause

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which imposed registration requirements on convicted sex offenders who traveled in interstate commerce, had a jurisdictional nexus, as was required to satisfy Commerce Clause. U.S. v. Mason, M.D.Fla.2007, 510 F.Supp.2d 923. Mental Health 433(2)

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), and the federal offense it created, of failing to register as a sex offender (FFR), was a proper exercise of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause; FFR had at least a de minimis effect on interstate travel, since it regulated sex offenders who traveled across state lines. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 433(2)

9. Venue

Failing to register as a sex offender, pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), was a continuing offense, and therefore venue was proper, in prosecution for traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register as a sex offender, in either Virginia, the state in which defendant's travel originated, or in Tennessee, the place to which defendant changed his residency and in which he failed to register; failure to register involved an element of interstate or foreign travel. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Criminal Law 113

10. Standing

Previously-convicted sex offender who could allege no injuries traceable to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act's (SORNA) alleged violations of procedural and substantive due process did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Act on such grounds. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Constitutional Law 885

11. Constitutional delegation of authority

Fact that Congress delegated the ability to specify applicability of registration requirements to sex offenders convicted before enactment of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), or its implementation in certain jurisdictions, or granted Attorney General the power to promulgate regulations to ensure registration of individuals outside the purview of statutory language, did not allow Attorney General to decide if the statute would have retroactive application, in violation of non-delegation doctrine; rather, the statutory language was indicative of a gap-filling provision to insure SORNA's clearly articulated purpose was effectuated when sex offenders fell outside the purview of statutory language. U.S. v. Mason, M.D.Fla.2007, 510 F.Supp.2d 923. Constitutional Law 2422(3)

Provision of Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) which gave Attorney General authority to decide whether persons classified as sex offenders, who were unable to register, should be subject to the registration requirements, was not unconstitutional, in violation of the non-delegation doctrine, as applied to defendant, a previously-convicted sex offender; the delegation of authority to the Attorney General was not so broad as to be violative of the non-delegation doctrine, and defendant was not a person who was unable to register within the meaning of the provision. U.S. v. Hinen, W.D.Va.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 747. Mental Health 433(2)


B. Civil Commitment Statute Annotations:

1/2 . Constitutionality

Civil commitment of those already in federal custody who, as result of mental condition, likely would commit sexually violent crimes had rational relation to congressional authority to proscribe and prevent such conduct, for purpose of Necessary and Proper Clause challenge. U.S. v. Shields, D.Mass.2007, 522 F.Supp.2d 317. United States 22

Congress lacked authority, under either the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause, to enact the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act section permitting the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons as it pertained to individuals previously committed due to mental incompetence to stand trial, to prisoners whose sentences were about to expire, or to people in federal custody against whom all criminal charges were dropped based on mental condition; the section at issue was aimed at preventing sexually violent conduct underlying various federal sex crimes, but it was the purview of the states to deal with such underlying conduct, and the federal government had no broad power generally to criminalize sexually dangerous conduct and child molestation. U.S. v. Comstock, E.D.N.C.2007, 507 F.Supp.2d 522. United States 22

Scope of Congress's auxiliary power to Necessary and Proper Clause authority extended so far as to allow Congress to prevent the release of federal inmates, whose sentences had expired, due to their sexually dangerous propensities, and thus statute providing for the civil commitment of such inmates was a valid exercise of Congress's legislative power and was not facially invalid, where Congress had rationally set up a process for determining which individuals were likely to commit further acts of sexual violence proscribed under Congress's Commerce Clause authority. U.S. v. Carta, D.Mass.2007, 503 F.Supp.2d 405. United States 22

1. Due process

Failure of statute governing civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons to require finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt that person had engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation prior to allowing that person's potentially indefinite commitment as sexually dangerous person constituted violation of due process. U.S. v. Shields, D.Mass.2007, 522 F.Supp.2d 317. Mental Health 433(2)

2. Equal protection

Government did not violate equal protection clause by designating certain federal prisoners whose terms were expiring as sexually dangerous persons and subjecting them to civil commitment procedures, although federal prison population contained relatively few sexually violent offenders and child molesters. U.S. v. Shields, D.Mass.2007, 522 F.Supp.2d 317. Mental Health 433(2)

3. Vagueness

Terms, “serious mental illness,” “serious difficulty,” “sexually violent conduct,” and “child molestation,” in Adam Walsh Act for civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons, provided sufficiently explicit standards to defeat vagueness challenge. U.S. v. Shields, D.Mass.2007, 522 F.Supp.2d 317. Mental Health 433(2)

4. Unreasonable seizure of person

To avoid serious questions under Fourth Amendment and Due Process Clause, provision under Adam Walsh Act for civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons would be construed to contain implicit requirement that opportunity for probable cause hearing before neutral decision maker had to be afforded within reasonable period of time after any detention resulting from stay of release at end of his prison sentence; except in exigent or extraordinary circumstances, and absent reasonable alternative, hearing had to occur within 48 hours after certified individual was detained beyond his scheduled release date. U.S. v. Shields, D.Mass.2007, 522 F.Supp.2d 317. Mental Health 462

5. Construction and application

Violation of due process by statute governing civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons, in not requiring finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt that such person had engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation prior to that person's indefinite commitment as sexually dangerous person, could be remedied by severing phrase “by clear and convincing evidence” from statute and allowing government to demonstrate that such person previously had been convicted of relevant sex crime. U.S. v. Shields, D.Mass.2007, 522 F.Supp.2d 317. Statutes 64(6)

6. Civil nature of commitment

Commitment scheme established by the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act section permitting the commitment of sexually dangerous persons was properly characterized as a civil scheme, not a criminal proceeding, thus defeating double jeopardy, ex post facto, cruel and unusual punishment, and jury trial claims challenging the scheme, such claims being cognizable only in the criminal or punitive context; the statute did not affix culpability for prior criminal conduct, no finding of scienter was required for commitment, and because the statute was explicitly aimed at confining people who had been found to have serious difficulty controlling their conduct, it could not be said that the it served a deterrent purpose. U.S. v. Comstock, E.D.N.C.2007, 507 F.Supp.2d 522. Sentencing and Punishment 1596

Statute providing for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous inmates whose sentences had been fulfilled was civil, rather than criminal, in nature, and thus statute did not facially violate any constitutional guarantee to those facing criminal charges, even though some effects of the statute were punitive in nature, such as the involuntary detention of the inmates, where statute was not otherwise so punitive in purpose or effect as to negate the intention to deem it civil. U.S. v. Carta, D.Mass.2007, 503 F.Supp.2d 405. Mental Health 456

7. Burden of proof

Use of a clear and convincing burden of proof by the section of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act permitting the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons violated the substantive due process rights of those subject to commitment under that section, despite claim that the clear and convincing standard properly allocated the risk of an erroneous commitment between the parties, and that post-deprivation proceedings existed to cure any erroneous commitment; reasonable doubt standard should have applied to the factual determination that an individual sought to be committed engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation, which determination was a condition precedent to commitment. U.S. v. Comstock, E.D.N.C.2007, 507 F.Supp.2d 522. Constitutional Law 4344

8. Certification of sexually dangerous person

Certificates that were issued to federal prisoners whose terms were expiring designating them as “sexually dangerous persons” under Adam Walsh Act violated due process, since each certification stated only that named individual had been certified based on review of his records and certification did not identify underlying instances of misconduct upon which certification had been made. U.S. v. Shields, D.Mass.2007, 522 F.Supp.2d 317. Mental Health 458

9. Standing

Persons in custody of Bureau of Prisons (BOP) who were certified as “sexually dangerous persons” under Adam Walsh Act, as private parties, did not have standing to assert independent constitutional claim alleging that Act violated Tenth Amendment. U.S. v. Shields, D.Mass.2007, 522 F.Supp.2d 317. States 4.16(1)

C. Non-annotation cases that nevertheless cite an Adam Walsh Provision

There are several cases that have cited the various provisions of the Adam Walsh Act since you last spoke on the topic. Included here are cases that did not yet appear in the annotations section above to the United States Code Annotated at this point in time, but seem to have some importance. Another observation is that there seemed to be no cases that have made their way to the various courts of appeals yet (at least, there appear to be no opinions from the courts of appeals).

U.S. v. LeTourneau, 534 F.Supp.2d 718, 720+ (S.D.Tex. Jan 09, 2008) – This looks to be the only Texas state or federal case analyzing the Adam Walsh law that we could find.

U.S. v. Thomas, 534 F.Supp.2d 912, 913+ (N.D. Iowa Feb 13, 2008)

U.S. v. Gould, 526 F.Supp.2d 538, 540+ (D.Md. Dec 13, 2007) (NO. CRIM.WDQ-07-0359)

U.S. v. Smith, 481 F.Supp.2d 846, 849 (E.D.Mich. Mar 08, 2007)

U.S. v. Lovejoy, 516 F.Supp.2d 1032, 1034+ (D.N.D. Sep 28, 2007)

Keep in mind, there are several unreported cases, or cases that just have not yet been reported yet. Some of these cases may be fairly important, but it is difficult to tell at this point in time. These cases are probably mostly concern various constitutional challenges to the statute (ex post facto, retroactive effect, commerce clause, due process challenges, etc.). Here are those cites, just in case you want to view them:

- U.S. v. Jorge-Salgado, 2008 WL 860832, *2 (8th Cir.(Minn.) Apr 02, 2008) (NO. 07-1505)
- U.S. v. Kent, 2008 WL 360624, *3+ (S.D.Ala. Feb 08, 2008) (NO. CRIM. 07-00226-CG)
- U.S. v. Bonner, 2007 WL 4372887, *1 (S.D.Ala. Dec 11, 2007) (NO. CRIM A 07-00264-KD)
- U.S. v. Kent, 2007 WL 2746773, *1+ (S.D.Ala. Sep 20, 2007) (NO. CRIM. A. 07-00226-KD)
- U.S. v. Terwilliger, 2008 WL 50075, *1+ (S.D.Cal. Jan 03, 2008) (NO. 07CR1254 BTM)
- U.S. v. Elliott, 2007 WL 4365599, *2+ (S.D.Fla. Dec 13, 2007) (NO. 07-14059-CR)
- U.S. v. Cardenas, 2007 WL 4245913, *1+ (S.D.Fla. Nov 29, 2007) (NO. 07-80108CR)
- U.S. v. Ambert, 2007 WL 2949476, *1 (N.D.Fla. Oct 10, 2007) (NO. 4:07-CR-053-SPM)
- U.S. v. Kelton, 2007 WL 2572204, *1 (M.D.Fla. Sep 05, 2007) (NO. 5:07-CR-30OC10GRJ)
- U.S. v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 2298004, *1 (N.D.Fla. Aug 09, 2007) (NO. 5:07CR27-RS)
- U.S. v. Beasley, 2007 WL 3489999, *1+ (N.D.Ga. Oct 10, 2007) (NO. CRIM.1:07CR115TCB)
- U.S. v. Cole, 2007 WL 2714111, *1+ (S.D.Ill. Sep 17, 2007) (NO. 07-CR-30062-DRH)
- U.S. v. Dixon, 2007 WL 4553720, *1+ (N.D.Ind. Dec 18, 2007) (NO. 3:07-CR-72 01 RM)
- U.S. v. Adkins, 2007 WL 4335457, *4+ (N.D.Ind. Dec 07, 2007) (NO. 1:07-CR-59)
- U.S. v. Howell, 2008 WL 313200, *1+ (N.D.Iowa Feb 01, 2008) (NO. CR07-2013-MWB)
- U.S. v. Howell, 2007 WL 3302547, *4+ (N.D.Iowa Nov 08, 2007) (NO. CR07-2013-MWB)
- U.S. v. May, 2007 WL 2790388, *2+ (S.D.Iowa Sep 24, 2007) (NO. 4:07-CR-00164-JEG, 1:07-CR-00059-JEG)
- U.S. v. Samuels, 2008 WL 169792, *2+ (E.D.Ky. Jan 17, 2008) (NO. CRIM.A. 07-62-DLB)
- U.S. v. Pitts, 2008 WL 474244, *1+ (M.D.La. Feb 14, 2008) (NO. CRIM.A. 07-157JVP-CN)
- U.S. v. Davis, 2008 WL 510599, *1+ (W.D.La. Jan 22, 2008) (NO. CRIM 07-60003)
- U.S. v. Mantia, 2007 WL 4730120, *2+ (W.D.La. Dec 10, 2007) (NO. CRIM. 07-60041)
- U.S. v. Pitts, 2007 WL 3353423, *1+ (M.D.La. Nov 07, 2007) (NO. CRIM.A. 07-157-A)
- U.S. v. Nugent, 2008 WL 413273, *3+ (W.D.Mo. Feb 13, 2008) (NO. 07-5056-01-CRSW-GAF)
- U.S. v. Rich, 2007 WL 4365735, *2+ (W.D.Mo. Oct 31, 2007) (NO. CRA070027401CRWHFS)
- U.S. v. Muzio, 2007 WL 2159462, *1+ (E.D.Mo. Jul 26, 2007) (NO. 4:07CR179 CDP)
- U.S. v. Muzio, 2007 WL 1629836, *1+ (E.D.Mo. Jun 04, 2007) (NO. 407CR179 CDP)
- U.S. v. Aldrich, 2008 WL 427483, *2+ (D.Neb. Feb 14, 2008) (NO. 8:07CR158)
- U.S. v. Hacker, 2008 WL 312689, *1+ (D.Neb. Feb 01, 2008) (NO. 8:07CR243)
- U.S. v. Aldrich, 2007 WL 4924932, *2+ (D.Neb. Dec 14, 2007) (NO. 8:07CR158)
- U.S. v. Patterson, 2007 WL 3376732, *1 (D.Neb. Nov 08, 2007) (NO. 8:07CR159)
- U.S. v. Patterson, 2007 WL 2904099, *3+ (D.Neb. Sep 21, 2007) (NO. 8:07CR159)
- U.S. v. Barnes, 2007 WL 2119895, *1+ (S.D.N.Y. Jul 23, 2007) (NO. 07 CR. 187)
- U.S. v. Deese, 2007 WL 2778362, *2 (W.D.Okla. Sep 21, 2007) (NO. CR-07-167-L)
- U.S. v. Sallee, 2007 WL 3283739, *1 (W.D.Okla. Aug 13, 2007) (NO. CR-07-152-L)
- U.S. v. Templeton, 2007 WL 445481, *2 (W.D.Okla. Feb 07, 2007) (NO. CR-06-291-M)
- U.S. v. Dillenbeck, 2007 WL 2684838, *1+ (D.S.C. Sep 07, 2007) (NO. 4:07-CR-213-RBH)
- U.S. v. Heriot, 2007 WL 2199516, *2 (D.S.C. Jul 27, 2007) (NO. CR 307-323)
- U.S. v. Utesch, 2008 WL 656066, *3+ (E.D.Tenn. Mar 06, 2008) (NO. 2:07-CR-105)
- U.S. v. Sawn, 2007 WL 2344980, *1+ (W.D.Va. Aug 15, 2007) (NO. CRIM 607CR00020)
- U.S. v. Roberts, 2007 WL 2155750, *1+ (W.D.Va. Jul 27, 2007) (NO. 6:07 CR 70031)

David Finn

Read more!

Wednesday, April 09, 2008

More Great Federal Sentencing Stuff from Amy Baron-Evans

Rita, Gall and Kimbrough:
A Chance for Real Sentencing Improvements



Amy Baron-Evans
April 4, 2008


In a series of cases beginning in 1999, the Supreme Court examined the historical
roots of the right to jury trial in both the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights. See U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, cl. 3, U.S. Const. Amend. 6. The Court concluded that the right to jury trial is both an individual right and a structural allocation of power to the people, and held that, in order to give it meaningful content, any fact that exposes a defendant to greater potential punishment must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

A majority of the Court in Booker applied this reasoning to hold that judicial
factfinding under the mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment. A different majority (with Justice Ginsburg in both) created a remedy, directing judges to impose a sentence that complies with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and to treat the guidelines as merely advisory within that statutory framework, and instructing courts of appeals to review all sentences for reasonableness.

In its most recent cases, Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), Kimbrough
v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007) and Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), and also in Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), the Court gave substantive and procedural content to the remedy, making clear that Section 3553(a) is the controlling sentencing law and rejecting the devices that were used after Booker to maintain a de facto mandatory guideline system.

Part I of this paper gives an overview of how these decisions clarify that Section
3553(a) really is the controlling law and the guidelines merely advisory. Part II outlines the procedural nuts and bolts and arguments for improved procedural safeguards. Part III describes the as-applied Sixth Amendment challenge invited by Justice Scalia. The most important part of this paper is Part IV, which describes the Court’s invitation to use empirical and policy critiques of the guidelines as sword and shield.

The influence of a particular guideline on an individual sentence will now depend on whether or not it is based on sound policy in light of empirical evidence, and any improvements to individual guidelines will be driven by challenges showing that they are not.

Table of Contents

I.
Section 3553(a) Really Is The Controlling Sentencing Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
A.
Guidelines Only One of Several Factors; Parsimony and Purposes Control . . . 2
B.
No More Mindless Uniformity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
C.
Guideline-Centric “Departure” Concepts Prohibited or Ignored . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
D.
Probation Is Punishment and Is an Option In Any Case In Which It Is Not
Prohibited By Statute, Despite Contrary Guideline Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
E.
The District Courts’ Vital Role in Improving the Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
II.
Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 5
1



A.
Sentencing Procedure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
B.
Appellate Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
C.
The District Court Has the Last Word on the “Extent” of Variance. . . . . . . . . . .7
D.
No Hierarchy of Review for Different Kinds of Non-Guideline Sentences . . . . .8
E.
What Will the Remedy Be if the Courts of Appeals Again Enforce a De Facto
Mandatory Guideline System? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
F.
Procedural Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
III.
As-Applied Sixth Amendment Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
IV.
Lack of Empirical Basis as Sword and Shield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.
A Sword in Favor of a Non-Guideline Sentence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
B.
A Shield Against Undue Influence at Sentencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
C.
A Shield Against Undue Influence on Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
D.
What to Look For and Where to Look . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
E.
Which Guidelines and Policy Statements Were Not Based on Past Practice? . . 18
F.
Have the Guidelines Evolved Based on Empirical Evidence and National
Experience Since Then? . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.
Commission Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
2.
Other Empirical/Policy Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
3.
Statistics Showing the Guideline is Not Being Followed . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.
Judicial Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
G.
What Effect Do Congressional Actions Have on the Analysis? . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
1.
Congressional Actions That Are Not Express Directives . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.
Express Congressional Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.
Guidelines that Contravene Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

I.
Section 3553(a) Really Is The Controlling Sentencing Law.

A.
Guidelines Only One of Several Factors; Parsimony and Purposes
Control

The “Guidelines are only one of the factors to consider when imposing sentence.”
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602. The Guidelines, “formerly mandatory, now serve as one factor among several courts must consider in determining an appropriate sentence.”
Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564. “The statute, as modified by Booker, contains an
overarching provision instructing district courts to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’ to achieve the goals of sentencing.” Kimbrough, at 570.

B.
No More Mindless Uniformity

After Booker, the government successfully convinced most courts of appeals to
replicate mandatory guidelines by claiming that uniformity was the primary or only goal of the Sentencing Reform Act. This was not accurate. The Commission was directed, among other things, to “avoid[] unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records who have been convicted of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(B).

Judges were directed to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” and to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

No one was directed to pursue mindless uniformity, but that is what
the Commission did, and the courts of appeals enforced it before and after Booker.1

In Gall and Kimbrough, the Court rejected mindless uniformity. Echoing the
statutes, the Court recognized that a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard could successfully balance the need to reduce unjustifiable disparities across the Nation and consider every convicted person as an individual.” Id. at 598 n.8 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).

Moreover, simply by “correctly calculat[ing] and review[ing] the guideline range,” a judge “necessarily [gives] significant weight and consideration to the need to avoid unwarranted disparities.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 599.

In a decisive rejection of mindless uniformity, the Court recognized
that unwarranted uniformity is every bit as objectionable as unwarranted disparity: “[I]t is perfectly clear that the District Judge . . . also considered the need to avoid unwarranted similarities among other co-conspirators who were not similarly situated.” Id. at 600 (emphasis in original).

In Kimbrough, the Court demoted the government’s (ironic) argument that
abandoning the 100:1 powder to crack ratio would result in disparities (“cliffs” and
differences among judges) to its proper place in the statutory framework: “To reach an appropriate sentence, these disparities must be weighed against the other § 3553(a) factors and any unwarranted disparity created by the crack/powder ratio itself.”
Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574. See also id. at 575 (approving district court’s
consideration of the fact that the 100-1 ratio “itself created an unwarranted disparity within the meaning of § 3553(a)”).

The Court also suggested that the Sentencing Commission could help to avoid unwarranted disparities through “ongoing revision of the Guidelines in response to sentencing practices.” Id. at 573-74. Finally, mindless uniformity cannot co-exist with the Booker remedy: “These measures will not eliminate variations between district courts, but our opinion in Booker recognized that some departures from uniformity were a necessary cost of the remedy we adopted.” Id. at 574.

C. Guideline-Centric “Departure” Concepts Prohibited or Ignored

In Gall, the Court not only used the terms “departure” and “variance”
interchangeably, Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594, 597, but made no mention whatsoever of the
“heartland” concept or the guidelines’ restrictions on consideration of individual
characteristics. This was so even though the case was all about a below-guideline
sentence based on offender characteristics that the guidelines ignore or deem “not
ordinarily relevant,” including age and immaturity, voluntary withdrawal from the
conspiracy, and self rehabilitation through education, employment, and discontinuing the use of drugs. Id. at 598-602. This strongly indicates that the “heartland” concept and the guidelines’ restrictive policy statements are no longer relevant, as some courts of appeals have held. Indeed, Section 3553(a)(1) requires the sentencing court to consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” in every case, and the statute trumps any guideline or policy statement to the contrary. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 44, 45 (1993); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997).

It is no longer permissible, in imposing or reviewing a non-guideline sentence, to
use percentages or proportional mathematical calculations based on the distance “from” the guideline range, or to require “extraordinary” circumstances. Gall, 128 S. Ct. 594, 595.

D.
Probation Is Punishment and Is an Option In Any Case In Which It Is
Not Prohibited By Statute, Despite Contrary Guideline Limits.

The Gall Court disapproved of the Eighth Circuit’s characterization of Gall’s
probationary sentence as a 100% downward variance in part because it gave no weight to the substantial restriction of liberty involved in even standard conditions of probation. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595-96 & n.4.

Further, in some cases, like Gall, “‘a sentence of imprisonment may work to promote not respect, but derision, of the law if the law is viewed as merely a means to dispense harsh punishment without taking into account the real conduct and circumstances involved in sentencing.’” Id. at 599 (quoting district
court opinion).

Finally, while some courts of appeals had reversed probationary sentences when
the guideline range was outside Zone A, relying on § 3553(a)(4) (“kinds of sentence . . established [by] the guidelines”), the Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that probation “lies outside the range of choice dictated by the facts of this case” because “§ 3553(a)(3) [“kinds of sentences available”] directs the judge to consider sentences other than imprisonment.” Id. at 602 & n.11.

E.
The District Courts’ Vital Role in Improving the Guidelines

In Rita, Justice Breyer described the intended evolution of the Guidelines, saying
that the Commission’s work is “ongoing,” that it “will” collect statements of reasons when district courts impose non-guideline sentences, that it “may” obtain advice from prosecutors, defenders, law enforcement groups, civil liberties associations, experts in penology, and others, and that it “can revise the Guidelines accordingly.” Id. at 2464.


II. Procedures

The sentencing procedures set forth in Gall and Kimbrough are an improvement
over those in use in the lower courts before these decisions. However, although Justice Breyer did not write either decision, his influence is in evidence, providing small openings, as he did in Booker and Rita, for the promotion of mandatory “guidelines creep.”4 The Commission is already “training” judges, clerks and probation officers as to the purported meaning of these cases with selectively chosen statements to promote another round of mandatory guidelines creep.

It is important for defense counsel to emphasize the overall import of the Court’s
procedural framework, which accords wide leeway to the sentencing judge to impose a
non-guideline sentence on a variety of grounds. Moreover, any procedural respect the
guidelines might otherwise have is not justified unless the guideline at issue is in fact based on empirical evidence of pre-Guidelines sentencing practice or empirical evidence developed since then. The most frequently applied guidelines do not meet that test. See Part IV, infra.

A. Sentencing Procedure

The sentencing judge “should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly
calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596. As a “matter of administration and to secure nationwide consistency,” the guideline range “should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.” Id. This is not particularly surprising or significant because the guideline range is the only § 3553(a) factor expressed as a number of months. Defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum, however, should ordinarily begin with a more compelling presentation, for example, the history and characteristics of the defendant or the nature and circumstances of the offense.

Because the “Guidelines are not the only consideration,” the judge, “after giving
both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate,”
“should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party.” Id. The judge must independently evaluate the
appropriate sentence in light of the Section 3553(a) purposes and factors, and must
consider arguments that the guidelines should not apply on general policy grounds, case-specific grounds (including guideline-sanctioned departures), or “regardless.” Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463, 2465, 2467-68.

In doing so, the judge “may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97; see also Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 4 This phrase was coined in Sands & Kalar, An Object All Sublime — Let the Punishment Fit the
Crime: Federal Sentencing After Gall and Kimbrough, The Champion (March 2008).

The judge “must make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented,” and “must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.

If the judge decides on an outside-guideline sentence, she “must consider the
extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The judge “must give serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain his conclusion that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate in a particular case with sufficient justifications” because the guidelines “are the product of careful study based on extensive empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing decisions,” but “[n]otably, not all of the Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence.” Id. at 594 & n.2.

The judge need not discuss arguments for or against a guideline sentence that are
not raised: “[I]t [is] not incumbent on the District Court Judge to raise every conceivably relevant issue on his own initiative.” Id. at 599. If the judge rejects nonfrivolous arguments for a non-guideline sentence, he must explain why. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2468.

B. Appellate Procedure

The court of appeals “must first ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.

If the sentence is “procedurally sound,” the court of appeals “then consider[s] the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence.” Id. at 597. The court of appeals must
review “all sentences-whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” and regardless of the “uniqueness of the individual case,” under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591, 598. The court of appeals may not simply mouth “abuse of discretion,” while in fact applying a de novo standard, as the Eighth Circuit did in Gall. Id. at 600, 602.

The court of appeals may not substitute its judgment for that of the sentencing
judge: “The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Id. at 597. This is because “[t]he sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case,” “sees and hears the evidence,makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record,” “has access to, and greater familiarity with, the individual case and the individual defendant before him than the Commission or the appeals court,” and has “an institutional advantage over appellate courts in making these sorts of
determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines sentences than appellate courts do.” Id. at 597-98 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not
required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597; see also Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2462. After Rita, courts of appeals may decline to apply a presumption of reasonableness to all within-guideline sentences, see United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 180 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 326 n.23 (3d Cir. 2007), or to sentences within a particular guideline. See Part IV, infra.
The
presumption is “not binding,” id. at 2463, and has no “independent legal effect.” Id. at 2465. “It does not, like a trial-related evidentiary presumption, insist that one side, or the other, shoulder a particular burden of persuasion or proof lest they lose their case.” Id. at 2462. It does not grant “greater factfinding leeway” to the Commission than to the sentencing judge. Id. at 2463. It “simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable.” Id.

“But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a
presumption of unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the deviation, but must ive due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify th extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. See also Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2467 (appeals court may not adopt a presumption of unreasonableness).

C. The District Court Has the Last Word on the “Extent” of Variance.

Undeniably, there is double talk in Gall on the central question of proportionality
review,but three things are clear. First, the appeals courts must apply a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard” to “all sentences-whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” and regardless of the “uniqueness of the individual case.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591, 598.

Second, the appeals court “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors justify the extent of the variance.” Id. at 597. Third, “[t]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of
the district court.” Id.

However, there are other statements that will sow confusion and be used to
promote mandatory guidelines creep, in particular, “We find it uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.” Id. at 597. However, while the appeals court “will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range,” and “may consider the extent of the deviation,” it “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597.

Further, “applying a heightened standard of review to sentences outside the
Guidelines range . . . is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions-whether inside or outside the Guidelines range.” Id. at 596. A “rule equiring ‘proportional’ justifications for departures from the Guidelines range is not consistent with our remedial opinion in” Booker. Id. at 594.

An “appellate rule that requires ‘extraordinary’ circumstances to
justify a sentence outside the Guidelines range,” or the use of percentages to determine the strength of the justifications required “come too close to creating an impermissible presumption of unreasonableness for sentences outside the Guidelines range.” Id. at 595.

D.
No Hierarchy of Review for Different Kinds of Non-Guideline

Sentences

The Commission is using dicta from Kimbrough (without identifying it as dicta)
to suggest that so-called “outside-the-heartland” “departures” are favored and judicial disagreement with the guideline based on the purposes of sentencing is disfavored. The theory behind the dicta is that District Courts are most familiar with the individual offense and offender, and the Commission at least has the capacity to formulate guidelines based on empirical data and national experience.6 Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574. “In light of these discrete institutional strengths, a district court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when the sentencing judge finds a particular case ‘outside the ‘heartland’ to which the Commission intends individual Guidelines to apply,’” but “while the Guidelines are no longer binding, closer review may be in order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view that the Guidelines range ‘fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations’
even in a mine-run case.” Id. at 574-75 (emphasis supplied).

Note that even on its own terms, this is descriptive of what “may” happen, not
prescriptive as to what must happen, and it would never apply if the judge articulated reasons based on evidence and/or experience showing that the guideline failed properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations.

In any event, the Court immediately clarified that this is pure dicta: “The crack
cocaine Guidelines, however, present no occasion for elaborate discussion of this matter because those Guidelines do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its
characteristic role.” Kimbrough, at 575.

Indeed, “discussion of this matter,” even briefly, sticks out like a sore thumb. It is in conflict with everything else the Court has said, i.e., courts must impose a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to satisfy sentencing purposes, must treat the guidelines as just one among several statutory factors, must be permitted to disagree with the guidelines based solely on policy considerations, and the courts of appeals may not grant greater factfinding leeway to the Commission than to the district courts. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 564, 570; Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602; Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2463, 2465,2468; Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 862-70 (2007).

The notion that so-called “outside-the-heartland” departures (the meaning of which remains unknown) are entitled to special deference was repudiated in Gall, which held that “all sentences-whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range,” and regardless of the “uniqueness of the individual case,” must be reviewed under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591, 598.

So where does this dicta come from and why is it here? Justice Ginsburg cites
pages 38-39 of the transcript of oral argument in Gall, where Justice Breyer said he wants to “interpret that word ‘reasonable’ so that we get back to a situation where judges do depart when they have something unusual and maybe occasionally when they think the guideline wasn’t considered properly.”7 This citation and the immediate clarification that it is dicta indicate that this was an idea Justice Breyer had, but that it has no force.

Indeed, it is mandatory guidelines speak.

Justice Scalia immediately set the record straight, stating in concurrence that he
joined “the opinion only because I do not take this to be an unannounced abandonment of the following clear statements in our recent opinions.” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 576 (Scalia, J., concurring).

After reviewing those clear statements, he said: These statements mean that the district court is free to make its own reasonable application of the § 3553(a) factors, and to reject (after due consideration) the advice of the Guidelines [as the majority just said at p. 570]. If there is any thumb on the scales; if the Guidelines must be followed even where the district court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors is entirely reasonable; then the “advisory” Guidelines would, over
a large expanse of their application, entitle the defendant to a lesser
sentence but for the presence of certain additional facts found by judge
rather than jury. This, as we said in Booker, would violate the Sixth
Amendment. Id. (emphasis in original).

Thus, there are a variety of grounds for imposing a non-guideline sentence, with
the only hierarchy of “respect” being that the controlling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), trumps any contrary provision of the guidelines. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 44, 45 (1993); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997).

If the court of appeals in your circuit nonetheless begins once again to hold that
district courts are not free to make their own application of the § 3553(a) factors and to reject the advice of the guidelines after due consideration, file petitions for certiorari arguing that judicial factfinding in your case and in your circuit violates the Sixth Amendment.

E.
What Will the Remedy Be if the Courts of Appeals Again Enforce a
De Facto Mandatory Guideline System?

At least three, and maybe five, justices seem prepared to reject the Booker remedy
in a case involving judicial factfinding if the courts of appeals again enforce a de facto mandatory guideline system.

In Rita, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg said they were “not blind to the fact that,
as a practical matter, many federal judges continued to treat the Guidelines as virtually mandatory after our decision in Booker,” but “[o]ur decision today makes clear . . . that the rebuttability of the presumption is real,” and “that appellate courts must review sentences individually and deferentially whether they are inside the Guidelines range . . . or outside that range.” Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2474 (Stevens, J., concurring). “Given the clarity of our holding,” these two justices “trust that those judges who had treated the Guidelines as virtually mandatory during the post-Booker interregnum will now recognize that the Guidelines are truly advisory.” Id.

Justice Scalia gives “stare decisis effect to the statutory holding of Rita,” but
believes that “any appellate review for substantive reasonableness will necessarily result in a sentencing scheme constitutionally indistinguishable from the mandatory Guidelines struck down in” Booker. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602 (Scalia, J., concurring).

In repeatedly inviting as-applied Sixth Amendment challenges, see Part III, infra, Justice Scalia is apparently setting the stage to prove Justice Breyer’s remedy a failure.


Justice Souter wrote separately in Gall to state that he sees the “objectionable
points” of Booker and Rita “hexing our judgments today.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603
(Souter, J., concurring). He believes that the best resolution would be for Congress to “reestablish[] a statutory system of mandatory sentencing guidelines (though not identical to the original in all points of detail), but providing for jury findings of all facts necessary to set the upper range of sentencing discretion.” Id. By the phrase, “not identical to the original in all points of detail,” Justice Souter apparently contemplates simplification and improvement of the current guidelines, but whether this would occur in the hands of Congress is unclear.

It does not appear that Justice Souter believes that the Court itself
could not require jury findings, given that he joined Justice Stevens’ dissent in Booker arguing that that the Court should do so. Booker, 543 U.S. at 271-303.

Justice Thomas has now rejected the Booker remedy because it is far broader than
necessary to correct constitutional error in that it applies even when there was no judicial factfinding (as in Gall and Kimbrough), the Sixth Amendment violation is “more suitably remedied by requiring any such facts [that raise the sentence beyond the level justified by the jury verdict or the defendant’s admission] to be submitted to the jury,” and the Court has “assume[d] the legislative role of devising a new sentencing scheme” with decisions grounded in policy considerations rather than law.” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 577-78 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 603 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

Some have read this to mean that Justice Thomas has reversed himself on the Sixth Amendment holding, but that is not correct. In Justice Thomas’ view, mandatory application of the guidelines did not violate the Sixth Amendment in Gall or Kimbrough because there was no judicial factfinding in those cases.

F. Procedural Safeguards

Standard of Proof. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt under
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause protects against factual error whenever a
potential loss of liberty is at stake. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64, 368 (1970). As Winship itself involved judicial factfinding in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, this is so regardless of the identity of the factfinder and whether or not the finding results in a conviction” of a “crime.” Facts to which the reasonable doubt standard applies are not just those that go to guilt or innocence, but those that increase punishment. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-99 (1975).

The Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in Apprendi: “Since Winship, we
have made clear beyond peradventure that Winship’s due process and associated jury
protections extend, to some degree, ‘to determinations that [go] not to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of his sentence.’ This was a primary lesson of Mullaney.”8 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484. See also Jones, 526 U.S. at 240-43 & n.6;

The Court distinguished McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) as involving a finding that resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence but that did not expose the defendant to additional punishment, within a range in which judicial discretion was otherwise entirely unfettered. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486; Jones, 526 U.S. at 242

Though the Supreme Court has considered the Fifth Amendment right to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in tandem with the Sixth Amendment jury trial right in recent cases, Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478, it remains clear that the Fifth Amendment due process right remains distinct, id. at 476-77, and applies equally to judicial factfinding. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004) (despite the absence of jury factfinding, judge’s use of the reasonable doubt standard assured that accuracy was not seriously diminished).

Thus, Booker’s resolution of the Sixth Amendment issue, which concerned
the reservation of control in the people against governmental power, did not address what standard of proof a judge must use under the Fifth Amendment to find facts that expose a defendant to additional loss of liberty. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 169 (2001) (“Constitutional rights are not defined by inferences from opinions which did not address the question at issue.”).

Factfinding under the advisory guidelines has a determinate, numerical impact on
the guideline range, which in turn drives the length of the ultimate sentence and exposes the defendant to additional loss of liberty within the meaning of Winship, Mullaney, and Apprendi.

The judge must “calculate” the guideline range “correctly,” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at
596, i.e., she must find the aggravating facts and assign them the required number of points. The judge must then use this “calculation” as the “starting point and the initial benchmark,” id., and must justify any “deviation” from it with a “justification [that] is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Id. at 597. This fact finding necessarily drives sentence length because the guideline range is the only § 3553(a) factor with a number affixed to it and is the benchmark from which both sentencing and appellate review proceed. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 595. Guideline factfinding thus exposes the defendant to loss of liberty, and is therefore required to be conducted based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt under Winship, Mullaney, and Apprendi.

Thorough Adversarial Testing.

The sentencing court must “subject[] the defendant’s sentence to the thorough adversarial testing contemplated by federal sentencing procedure.” Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465. The phrase “federal sentencing procedure” appears to include both the rules of procedure and the requirements of the Due Process Clause, as the citation for this proposition is “Rules 32(f), (h), (i)(C) and (i)(D)” and “Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991) (recognizing importance of notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard at sentencing).”

The narrow holding of Burns was that an earlier version of Rule 32 that did not
include subsection (h) must be read to require advance notice of a district court’s
intention to impose an upward departure in order to avoid the serious constitutional
question whether the Due Process Clause requires notice. Burns also tells us what the components of “thorough adversarial testing” are: notice, a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the right to confront adverse witnesses and evidence, and the right to a full, formal, adversarial-style hearing. See id. at 137-38.. By comparison, the Guidelines’ advice to find facts by a “preponderance” of the “probabl[y] accurate” “information,” including hearsay, USSG § 6A1.3, p.s., is clearly deficient.

Moreover, the Commission is not empowered to advise that the preponderance standard “is appropriate to meet due process concerns” because only courts are empowered by our Constitution to announce minimum constitutional standards, and the Commission is not a court. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384-85, 393-94, 408 (1989).

Notice of Upward Variance, Probation Officer’s Recommendation.

The “thorough adversarial testing” passage from Rita would also seem to decide the issue of whether notice of an upward variance under Section 3553(a) is required.9 See Irizarry v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 828 (2008) (granting certiorari to resolve this question). It also would seem to require the Probation Officer’s recommendation to be disclosed to the defendant.

III. As-Applied Sixth Amendment Challenges

In his concurrence in Gall, Justice Scalia repeated his invitation, first made in
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2479 (Scalia, J., concurring), to bring as-applied Sixth Amendment challenges. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing that such a challenge may be brought).

Noting that “the Court has not foreclosed as-applied constitutional challenges,”
Justice Scalia states that the “door therefore remains open for a defendant to demonstrate that his sentence, whether inside or outside the advisory Guidelines range, would not have been upheld but for the existence of a fact found by the sentencing judge and not by the jury.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 602-03 (Scalia, J., concurring).

The best cases for this argument are those in which a judicial finding of fact has a
very large impact on the sentence, especially if the facts found are crimes of which the jury acquitted or that were never charged. As stated by the Appellant in an acquitted crimes case that will be argued before the en banc Sixth Circuit on June 4, 2008: “Unless this Court can say that it would uphold Mr. White’s 264-month sentence as reasonable absent the district court’s reliance on acquitted crimes for 167 months of that sentence, the sentence violated the Sixth Amendment.” See Brief of Appellant, United States v. White at 12, No. 05-6596, http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/White_Appellant_Brief.pdf.


IV. Lack of Empirical Basis as Sword and Shield

In Rita, Gall and Kimbrough, at each point at which the guidelines are denied or
given some form of procedural or substantive respect, it depends on whether the
Commission actually exercised its capacity to develop guidelines based on empirical
data. We are invited to demonstrate that the Commission failed to do so with respect to the guideline at issue, using it as both sword and shield.

A. A Sword in Favor of a Non-Guideline Sentence

District court judges must now consider and respond to nonfrivolous arguments
that the guideline sentence itself reflects an unsound judgment because it fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations, does not treat defendant characteristics in the proper way, or that a different sentence is appropriate regardless. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465, 2468 (2007).

District courts are no longer required, or permitted, to simply defer to Commission policies. Id. Courts of appeals may not “grant greater factfinding leeway to [the Commission] than to [the] district judge.” Id. at 2463.

Why would Justice Breyer invite litigants and courts to test the Guidelines?
Perhaps it is because the Guidelines cannot evolve unless the Commission hears and
incorporates feedback from sentencing judges. See Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464 (Commission “can revise the Guidelines accordingly”) (emphasis supplied); Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 573-74 (Commission “will help to ‘avoid excessive sentencing disparities’” through ongoing revision of the Guidelines in response to sentencing practices.”) (emphasis supplied). That dialogue and evolution did not occur when the guidelines were mandatory,10 as Justice Breyer has recognized.11 In any event, he needed a majority, and the Court had already held 6-3 in Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007) that a system that does not permit judges to sentence outside a recommended range based on “general objectives of sentencing” alone without a “factfinding anchor” violates the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 862-70.

Thereafter, even the “Government acknowledge[d] that . . .
‘courts may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on policy considerations,
including disagreements with the Guidelines.’”12 Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 570.

Gall is an example of the Guidelines not treating defendant characteristics in the
proper way, i.e., as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). There, the Court upheld a non-
guideline sentence in which the judge imposed a sentence of probation based on
characteristics of the defendant which are required to be considered under § 3553(a)(1) and must be taken into account in order to avoid unwarranted disparities and unwarranted similarities under § 3553(a)(6), but which the Guidelines ignore or deem not ordinarily relevant, including age and immaturity, voluntary withdrawal from a conspiracy, and self rehabilitation through education, employment, and discontinuing the use of drugs. Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 598-602.

Kimbrough was an “unremarkable” “mine-run” case in which the guideline itself
reflects unsound judgment in that it fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations. 128 S. Ct. at 575.

There, the Court upheld a below-guideline sentence in an ordinary
crack trafficking case because the crack guidelines (like all of the drug guidelines) were not based on past practice at their inception, and reflect unsound judgment in light of the purposes of sentencing and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities. The Court said: “In the main,” the Commission used an “empirical approach based on data about past practices, including 10,000 presentence investigation reports,” but it “did not use this empirical approach in developing the Guidelines sentences for drug-trafficking offenses.”
Id. at 567.

When a guideline is not the product of “empirical data and national
experience,” it is not an abuse of discretion to conclude that it “yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve §3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case.” Id. at 575.

After Kimbrough, the courts of appeals “must re-examine [their] case law”
holding that “courts were not authorized to find that the guidelines themselves, or that the statutes on which they are based, are unreasonable.” United States v. Marshall, slip op.,2008 WL 55989 at **8-9 (7th Cir. Jan. 4, 2008).

Of course, the facts of the case must fit whatever it is that you contend is wrong
with the guideline. For example, an argument that the career offender guideline overstates the risk of recidivism when the predicates are drug offenses does not work for a client whose only predicates are crimes of violence, though there may be other arguments to reject the career offender guideline in the case. As the Court said in Kimbrough, “the District Court properly homed in on the particular circumstances of Kimbrough’s case and accorded weight to the Sentencing Commission’s consistent and emphatic position that the crack/powder disparity is at odds with § 3553(a).” 128 S. Ct. at 576.

The Court did not mean that the district court properly relied on something “unique” about Mr.Kimbrough or his offense because it made quite clear that this was an “unremarkable” “mine-run” case. What it meant was that the facts of the case fit what is wrong with the crack cocaine guidelines. Thus, you are not seeking a “categorical” rejection of a guideline in all possible cases, but a rejection of the guideline in this case because the facts fit the policy problems of the guideline.

This challenge must be raised and developed by counsel. While the court could
raise it sua sponte, this is unlikely and there is no recourse on appeal if it does not. See United States v. Marshall, slip op., 2008 WL 55989 at *8 (7th Cir. Jan. 4, 2008) (judge was not required to reject the career offender guideline sua sponte).

B. A Shield Against Undue Influence at Sentencing

The reason the judge must seriously consider the extent of any departure from the
guideline range and give sufficient justifications for an unusually harsh or lenient
sentence is that the guidelines are “the product of careful study based on extensive
empirical evidence derived from the review of thousands of individual sentencing
decisions.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594. But the Court immediately qualified this general assumption: “Notably, not all of the Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence. For example, the Sentencing Commission departed from the empirical approach when setting the Guidelines range for drug offenses, and chose instead to key the Guidelines to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences that Congress established for such crimes,” the effect of which “is addressed in Kimbrough.” Id. at 594 n.2.

In Kimbrough, the Court said that district courts must treat the guidelines as the
“starting point and initial benchmark” because the Commission “has the capacity courts lack to ‘base its determinations on empirical data and national experience.’” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574 (internal citations omitted). However, this does not pertain to guidelines, like the crack guidelines, that “do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role. In formulating Guidelines ranges for crack cocaine offenses, as we earlier noted, the Commission looked to the mandatory minimum sentences set in the 1986 Act, and did not take account of ‘empirical data and national experience.’

Indeed, the Commission itself has reported that the crack/powder disparity
produces disproportionately harsh sanctions, i.e., sentences for crack cocaine offenses ‘greater than necessary’ in light of the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted).

C. A Shield Against Undue Influence on Appeal

The courts of appeals may, but are not required, to apply a presumption of
reasonableness to a within-guideline sentence. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2462; Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. After Rita, courts of appeals can still decline to apply a presumption of reasonableness to all within-guideline sentences, United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 180 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 326 n.23 (3d Cir. 2007), or to a sentence within a particular guideline. In Rita, the basis for the non-binding- independent-legal-effect presumption was that it was “fair to assume” that the guidelines “reflect a rough approximation” of sentences that “might achieve 3553(a) objectives” because the original Commission (instead of basing the Guidelines on the purposes of sentencing as Congress directed, see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A)) used an empirical approach” based on “past practice,” and the Guidelines “can” evolve in response to non-guideline sentencing decisions and consultation with the criminal justice community. Rita, at 2464-65 (emphasis supplied). Thus, the court of appeals should not apply a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within a particular guideline range when the Commission did not use this empirical approach to create the guideline or amend it in response to empirical evidence or feedback from judges and other participants in the criminal justice system.

If the government argues that the “closer review” dicta in Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct.
at 574-75, should be taken as an instruction from the Supreme Court rather than the dicta that it is, see Part II.D, supra, it simply does not apply when the guideline at issue in the case “do[es] not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic role.” Kimbrough, at 575.

Put another way, if a judge relies on evidence from the Commission
itself or another reliable source showing “that the Guidelines range ‘fails properly to reflect § 3553(a) considerations’ even in a mine-run case,” the judge is not “var[ying] from the Guidelines based solely on the judge’s view.” Id. at 575 (emphasis supplied).

D. What to Look For and Where to Look

When a guideline is not the product of “empirical data and national experience,”
i.e., the Commission did not exercise its capacity for expertise, judges have wide leeway to reject the guideline itself as reflecting unsound judgment even in a “mine-run case.” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575. This is true if the guideline (1) was not based on past practice/empirical data at its inception; (2) was created or amended after the initial set of guidelines with no empirical basis; (3) was created or amended contrary to the Commission’s own data or other available data or policy analyses; (4) has not been amended in the face of later data that shows it to be unsound; and/or (5) was created or amended for no stated reason.

Sentencing Resource Counsel and the Defender Guideline Committee are in the
process of developing an online reference manual (entitled Deconstructing The
Guidelines which will be linked from www.fd.org) that will critically examine the history and empirical basis (or lack thereof) of the most frequently encountered guidelines and policy statements.

It will also provide a guide to doing it yourself, in case the provision
at issue in your case is too rarely used to be included or has not yet been completed. Check the online manual frequently, as this will be an ongoing process.

Meanwhile, always begin by checking the Reasons for Amendment in Appendix
C of the Guidelines Manual corresponding to the amendments listed in the Historical
Note at the end of each guideline. Is there any indication that empirical evidence
supported the guideline or subsequent amendments? Often, you will find no reason,
which itself demonstrates that the amendment was not based on empirical evidence.13

Often, the Commission will cite a new law enacted by Congress. Such citations must be critically evaluated as explained in Part G, infra. Review the law cited to determine whether or not it contains a congressional directive, and if so, what it actually says.

A typical example is the reason for prohibiting consideration of lack of guidance as a youth and similar factors indicating a disadvantaged background: “This amendment provides that the factors specified are not appropriate grounds for departure.” USSG, App. C, amend. 466 (Nov. 1,1992).

Analyze the law’s legislative history. Where a guideline has been amended, follow these steps for each amendment.

Look for affirmative evidence that the guideline is not based on empirical
evidence, does not advance sentencing purposes, and does not avoid unwarranted
disparities or unwarranted similarities. Much of this evidence has already been
assembled in The Continuing Struggle for Just, Effective and Constitutional Sentencing After United States v. Booker (August 2006),
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/EvansStruggle.pdf, which addresses, to a greater or lesser
extent, restrictions and prohibitions on individual characteristics and offense
circumstances, relevant conduct, drug offenses, immigration offenses, economic crimes, firearms offenses, sex crimes, the career offender guideline, the Guidelines’ failure to properly account for first offender status, various other problems with the criminal history rules, and the unnecessary use of imprisonment.

Check for relevant materials on www.fd.org, on the Sentencing Resource page,
http://www.fd.org/odstb_SentencingResource3.htm, the Crack Cocaine page,
http://www.fd.org/odstb_CrackCocaine.htm, and the Defender Recommendations to the
Commission, http://www.fd.org/pub_SentenceLetters.htm. Many resources are also cited
in Parts E, F and G, infra.

E.
Which Guidelines and Policy Statements Were Not Based on Past
Practice?

Congress directed the Commission to consider all four statutory purposes set forth
in Section 3553(a)(2) in developing the guidelines.14 The original Commissioners,
however, “considered” only “just deserts” and “crime control,” then expressly abandoned those two purposes when they could not agree on which should predominate.

They solved their “philosophical dilemma” by adopting an “empirical approach that uses data estimating the existing sentencing system as a starting point.”16 At the instance of Justice Breyer, the Court now accepts that this makes the Guidelines a “rough approximation” of the statutory purposes set forth in Section 3553(a)(2), see Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2464; Gall,128 S. Ct. at 594, but recognizes that “not all of the Guidelines are tied to this empirical evidence.” Id. at 594 n.2.


Further, in estimating past practice sentencing levels, the Commission did not
include probationary sentences. See Supplementary Report at 24. This was no small
omission, since nearly 40% of all defendants were sentenced to straight probation in
1984. See Fifteen Year Report at 43. As of 2002, only 14% of all defendants were
sentenced to straight probation under the restrictive mandatory Guidelines. Id. Only
7.7% received straight probation in 2007, after Booker. See U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 2007 Sourcebook, Figure D. Straight probation should be used more freely
after Gall. See Part I.D, supra.

The use of uncharged and acquitted separate offenses to calculate the guideline
range also was not based on past practice and is inconsistent with national experience. See United States v. White, Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 22-25 (discussing evidence with respect to acquitted crimes, most of which is equally applicable to uncharged crimes), ttp://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/White_Appellant_Brief.pdf.

The Commission “deviated from average past practice” when it deemed offender
characteristics other than criminal history to be not ordinarily relevant, as one of its “‘trade-offs’ among Commissioners with different viewpoints.” Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17
Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 19-20 (1988). This was also contrary to congressional will. See Part G, infra.

As Justice Breyer stated in 1987, “once the Commission decided to abandon the
touchstone of prior past practice, the range of punishment choices was broad” and the “resulting compromises do not seem too terribly severe,” but the guidelines would evolve” based on information from actual practice under the guidelines. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 18-20, 23 (1988).

F.
Have the Guidelines Evolved Based on Empirical Evidence and
National Experience Since Then?

Since then, the Commission has amended the guidelines in a “one-way upward
ratchet increasingly divorced from considerations of sound public policy and even from the commonsense judgments of frontline sentencing professionals who apply the rules.” See Frank O. Bowman III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A
Structural Analysis, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1315, 1319-20 (2005). How to show this?

1. Commission Studies
The Commission has published studies based on empirical evidence identifying
problems with the guidelines that have not yet been addressed. In addition to the reports on crack cocaine sentencing,18 the Commission’s Fifteen Year Report identifies serious problems with the career offender guideline, the relevant conduct rules, the drug guidelines generally, and various forms of disparity that have increased under the Guidelines, most notably racial disparity and hidden disparities caused by the government’s practices as permitted and encouraged by the Guidelines.

The Commission has published three reports on recidivism, identifying numerous factors that predict reduced recidivism that are prohibited or discouraged from consideration by the Guidelines and factors that do not predict recidivism which are included in the Guidelines.

Judges have relied on these extra-guideline findings to impose non-
guideline sentences that better comply with § 3553(a),21 and are clearly free to do so after Kimbrough.

The “modest” two-level reduction in the crack guidelines is “‘only . . . a partial remedy’ for the problems generated by the crack/powder disparity.” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 569. “The amended Guidelines still produce sentencing ranges keyed to the [now discredited] mandatory minimums in the 1986 Act.” Id. at 569 n.10 (emphasis supplied). The pre-amendment guidelines “produced sentencing ranges that slightly exceeded those statutory minimums,” while the amended ranges “include” them. Id. at 569 n.10 (emphasis in original). U.S. Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal Criminal Justice System is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform 47-55, 76, 82, 91, 94, 102-06, 111-15, 117, 122, 131-35, 140-42 (2004).



3. Statistics Showing the Guideline is Not Being Followed

A guideline is not based on empirical evidence or national experience when
judges increasingly impose non-guideline sentences in the face of this guideline. In
March 2006, the Commission published a report on the impact of Booker which identifies some of the kinds of cases in which below-guideline sentences had increased in the first year or so after Booker, including all drug trafficking cases, career offender cases, first demonstrated to fray family and community bonds, and contribute to an increase in recidivism and future criminality.”); Patricia M. Wald, “What About the Kids?’: Parenting Issues in Sentencing, 8 Fed. Sent. Rep. 137 (1995) (discussing growing body of research showing that children fare better in their parents’ care than in foster care or elsewhere).


4. Judicial Decisions

Many district court decisions and some appellate decisions identify and explain
issues the Commission has not addressed. For example, after Booker, district courts have issued many decisions showing that the career offender guideline fails to distinguish between serious and non-serious offenses.29 In United States v. Ennis, 468 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 & n.11 (D. Mass. 2006), the judge pointed out that the definition of career offender predicates covers misdemeanor convictions, contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), from states with misdemeanors punishable by more than one year. In United States v. Baird, slip op., 2008 WL 151258 (D. Neb. Jan. 11, 2008), the judge described how the child pornography guideline was not based on empirical evidence.

In at least three cases, judges have declined to follow the “bad math” embodied in the new marijuana equivalency table for crack in multi-drug cases. See United States v. Molina, slip op., 2008 WL 544703 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 28, 2008) United States v. Horta, __ F.Supp.2d __,2008 WL 445893 (D. Me. 2008); United States v. Watkins, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2008 WL 152901 (D. Tenn. 2008). In United States v. Quinn, 472 F. Supp. 2d 104, 111 (D. Mass. 2007), the judge identified a “structural problem” in the relevant conduct rule as demonstrated by two different probation officers “calculating” ranges of 37-46 months and 151-188 months for two identically-situated defendants in the same case.

In United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the judge explained how calculations under the fraud guideline based on unintended loss and various overlapping adjustments resulted in a “patently absurd” life sentence. United States v. Gener, Crim. No. 04-424-17, 2005 WL 2838984 *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2005) illustrated the problem with including juvenile adjudications with a sentence of 60 days or more in the criminal history score where the juvenile offense is trivial and the length of confinement results not from the gravity of the offense but family circumstances and special needs.

Judicial decisions evaluate offenses and offenders in light of sentencing purposes
in ways that the Guidelines simply do not, for example, discussing the statistical
likelihood of recidivism of persons of the defendant’s age, educational level and work history, the deterrent value and societal cost of lengthy prison sentences for the type of offense, the community’s view of the seriousness of the offense, the efficacy of substance abuse or other mental health treatment. See, e.g., United States v. Brennan, 468 F. Supp. 2d 400, 404-08 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Holden, No. 06-20345, 2007 WL 1712754 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2007); United States v. Nellum, Crim. No. 2:04-30, 2005 WL 300073 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 3, 2005); United States v. Perella, 273 F. Supp. 2d 162 (D.Mass. 2003).

On the issue of addiction and treatment, which the Guidelines do not
recognize, Judge Gertner has written: The status of being addicted has an ambiguous relationship to the defendant’s culpability. It could be a mitigating factor, explaining the motivation for the crime. It could be an aggravating factor, supporting a finding of likely recidivism. Barbara S. Meierhoefer, The Role of Offense and Offender Characteristics in Federal Sentencing, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev.
367, 385 (1992).

On the other hand, the relationship between drug rehabilitation and crime is clear. If drug addiction creates a propensity to crime, drug rehabilitation goes a long way to preventing recidivism. In fact, statistics suggest that the rate of recidivism is less for drug offenders who receive treatment while in prison or jail, and still less for those treated outside of a prison setting. Lisa Rosenblum, Mandating Effective Treatment for Drug Offenders, 53 Hastings L.J. 1217, 1220 (2002).
Perella, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 164.

G. What Effect Do Congressional Actions Have on the Analysis?

After Gall and Kimbrough, the fact that a guideline (or amendment to a guideline)
was spawned by congressional action is a red flag for lack of empirical basis, raising the question whether the guideline reflects unsound judgment. See Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 n.2 (“For example, the Sentencing Commission departed from the empirical approach when setting the Guidelines range for drug offenses, and chose instead to key the Guidelines to the statutory mandatory minimum sentences that Congress established for such crimes.”); Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 575 (“The crack cocaine Guidelines . . . do not exemplify the Commission's exercise of its characteristic institutional role.

In formulating Guidelines ranges for crack cocaine offenses, as we earlier noted, the Commission looked to the mandatory minimum sentences set in the 1986 Act, and did not take account of ‘empirical data and national experience.’”); id. at 569 n.10 (“The amended Guidelines still produce sentencing ranges keyed to the mandatory minimums in the 1986 Act.”).

The Court recognizes that Congress makes mistakes, and that when the
Commission blindly follows or exacerbates a congressional mistake with guidelines that are not based on empirical evidence or experience, and that are contrary to sentencing purposes and/or create unwarranted disparities or unwarranted similarities, the courts are free to reject such guidelines. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 567-68, 569 n.2, 571-72, 574-75;
Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 594 & n.2.

Congress created the Sentencing Commission as an independent expert body and
placed it in the Judicial Branch. The Supreme Court upheld the promulgation of the
Guidelines by the Commission against Separation of Powers challenge, “not without
difficulty,” based in part on a prediction that the Commission would not be enlisted in the work of the political branches, but instead would bring “judicial experience and expertise” to the “neutral endeavor” of sentencing, “the Judicial Branch’s own business.”Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407-08 (1989).

Justice Scalia disagreed, stating that it was “not about commingling, but about the creation of a new Branch altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress.” Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

From the start, the Commission based the guidelines in very large measure on the
actions and influences of Congress and the Department of Justice, rather than
independent expertise, beginning with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.30 The
Commission has acknowledged that the goals of sentencing reform have not been fully
achieved because, “[i]n some cases, the results of research and collaboration have been overridden or ignored . . . through enactment of mandatory minimums or specific
directives to the Commission.”31 See Fifteen Year Report at vii.

The term “directives” may convey the impression of express instructions to amend the guidelines in particular ways, but many of the guidelines were created or amended as a reflexive response to a new or increased mandatory minimum, an increased statutory maximum, an instruction to study some aspect of sentencing or to change penalties if appropriate, or behind-thescenes discussions not in the public record at all.

In some instances, the Commission exceeded an express congressional directive, or took other action that appears to contravene congressional intent.

1. Congressional Actions That Are Not Express Directives

In Kimbrough, the government acknowledged that in general, courts may vary
from the guidelines based on policy considerations alone, including disagreements with the guidelines, but argued that the 100-1 powder to crack ratio was an exception because it was a “specific policy determination” by Congress which the Commission and sentencing courts were required to follow. Id. at 570. The Court rejected this characterization because the Anti-Drug Abuse Act “mandates only maximum and minimum sentences,” but “says nothing about the appropriate sentences within these brackets, and we decline to read any implicit directive into that congressional silence.” Id. at 571.

If it were otherwise, the Commission could not have exercised its own policy
judgment to use a different method than the statute for calculating the weight of LSD. Id. at 571-72 (discussing Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996)).

Neither “logical incoherence” with a statute, nor a directive to study and recommend unspecified amendments, constitutes a congressional command. Id. at 571-73.

Judges are free to disagree with guidelines that were created or increased in
response to an increase in a statutory maximum, a new or increased mandatory minimum, or a directive to study or raise sentences if “appropriate.” The Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference has urged the Commission, when deciding whether to amend the guidelines in response to a mandatory minimum, to make an assessment based on its own expert opinion and independent of any potentially applicable mandatory minimum, and if the resulting guideline, alone or in combination with specific offense characteristics, is lower than the mandatory minimum, § 5G1.1(b) can operate. See Comments of the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference (March 16, 2007), http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/03_20_07/walton-testimony.pdf.

The Criminal Law Committee suggested that the Commission could consider in its independent evaluation any information in published reports or hearing records upon which Congress may have relied. Id. This recommendation was made in connection with proposed amendments responding to the Adam Walsh Act, which has no legislative history whatsoever.

2. Express Congressional Directives

In response to the government’s argument that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
“implicitly” required the Commission to write guidelines corresponding to the mandatory minimums and extrapolating below, between and above those two levels, the Court said that “[d]rawing meaning from silence is particularly inappropriate here, for Congress has shown that it knows how to direct sentencing practices in express terms.” Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 571.

As an example, it referred to 28 U.S.C. § 994(h), the statute upon
which the (in many ways broader, see sub-part 3, infra) career offender guideline is
based.

Does this mean that a guideline which follows to the letter a congressional
directive stated in “express terms” is immune from scrutiny as a potentially unsound
judgment? That question was not before the Court, but the answer must be “No.” Even
the government recognizes as much. See Brief of the United States at 29, Kimbrough v. United States (“As long as Congress expresses its will wholly through the Guidelines system, the policies in the Guidelines will best be understood as advisory under Booker and subject to the general principles of sentencing in section 3553(a).”); Letter stating the government’s position on the career offender guideline, docketed March 17, 2008 in United States v. Funk, No. 05-3708, 3709 (6th Cir.) (“position of the United States” is that “Kimbrough’s reference to [§ 994(h)] reflected the conclusion that Congress intended the Guidelines to reflect the policy stated in Section 994(h), not that the guideline implementing that policy binds federal courts.”) (emphasis in original), available on the
Sentencing Resource Page of www.fd.org.

Congress has the exclusive right and responsibility to legislate statutory
minimums and maximums,and those outer limits trump any inconsistent guideline
range, as is obvious, and as USSG § 5G1.1 says.

But when Congress uses the Commission as a conduit for a specific sentence or sentencing increase, the resulting guideline is but one factor to be considered under § 3553(a), and is subject to the same critical analysis as other guidelines, as the courts have found in both career offender and child pornography cases. See United States v. Martin, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 748104 (1st Cir. Mar. 21, 2008) (courts have broad discretion to sentence below career offender guideline under Gall and Kimbrough); United States v. Sanchez, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 553517 ** 9-11 (2d Cir. Feb. 29, 2008) (Section 994(h) is a directive to the Commission,
not the courts); United States v. Marshall, slip op., 2008 WL 55989 **7-8 (7th Cir. Jan. 4, 2008) (“We must reexamine our case law” holding “that courts are not authorized to find that the guidelines themselves, or the statutes upon which they are based, are unreasonable . . . in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kimbrough.”); United States v. Malone, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13648 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 22, 2008) (imposing below guideline sentence based on Commission’s reports finding career offender guideline unsound); United States v. Baird, slip op., 2008 WL 151258 (D. Neb. 2008) (“Because . . . the Guidelines for child [pornography] offenses, like the drug-trafficking Guidelines, were not developed under the empirical approach, but . . . in response to statutory directives. . . . the court affords them less deference than it would to empirically-grounded guidelines.”).


3. Guidelines that Contravene Statutes

Where a guideline, policy statement or commentary is inconsistent with a specific
statutory provision, the statute controls. See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757-58 (1997) (amendment of career offender guideline to define “offense statutory
maximum” not to include an increased maximum under 21 U.S.C. § 851 was in conflict
with the plain meaning of “maximum term authorized” in 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) and “must
bow to the specific directives of Congress”); Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 292-95 (1996) (Commission could use a constructive weight method for LSD in the guidelines instead of the actual weight method used in 21 U.S.C. § 841 as construed in Chapman, but the statute controls at the mandatory minimum levels and the Commission has no authority to override it); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 44, 45 (1993) (guidelines, policy statements and commentary must yield to the plain meaning of a statute).

Appendix C of the Guideline Manual sets forth the Reason for Amendment for
each guideline amendment. While the Reason for Amendment may say that it was
promulgated pursuant to a statute, closer inspection may reveal that the amendment
conflicts with the statute. For example, USSG § 3B1.4 increases the offense level by two levels for use of a minor in committing a crime, regardless of the defendant’s age, but the statute pursuant to which this guideline was promulgated stated that the defendant must be at least 21 year of age. The Sixth Circuit held that because the guideline was “in conflict with a clear congressional directive,” it could not be applied to a defendant under the age of 21. See United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839, 849-52 (6th Cir. 2000).

Another example is the career offender guideline, which purports to implement 28
U.S.C. § 994(h), but which defines the predicates far more broadly than Congress
required in the statute. See Amy Baron-Evans, The Continuing Struggle for Just,
Effective and Constitutional Sentencing After United States v. Booker at 48-51 (August 2006), http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/EvansStruggle.pdf.

Another example is Chapter 5’s policy statements deeming various offender
characteristics to be never or not ordinarily relevant. Congress directed the Commission to consider the relevance of a variety of offender characteristics, 28 U.S.C. § 994(d), and to reflect the “general inappropriateness of considering” education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and community ties “in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(e).

The purpose of
28 U.S.C. § 994(e) was “to guard against the inappropriate use of incarceration for those defendants who lack education, employment, and stabilizing ties,” but “each of these factors,” in both § 994(d) and (e), “may play other roles in the sentencing decision.” S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 175 (1983).

The purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) was not to prohibit or discourage consideration of these factors to mitigate punishment, as the Commission has done. Moreover, these factors must be considered under Section 3553(a)(1).

An interesting example which unfairly affects many sentences are the application
notes to USSG § 1B1.3 which require the guideline range to be calculated based on
uncharged and acquitted crimes. This is contrary to the plain language of the Sentencing Reform Act, was not intended by Congress according to the legislative history, and has never been reviewed by Congress because it is buried in application notes which are not required to be submitted to Congress for review, as explained in United States v. White, Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at 15-21,
http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/White_Appellant_Brief.pdf.

The White case will be argued on June 4, 2008 before the en banc Sixth Circuit.

David Finn

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